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RESPONSE TO EVANS'S OBJECTION
TO THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff/appellee Jamie Evans disagrees with defendant/appellant the Board
of County Commissioners of Utah County's ("County's") inclusion of language
from Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, 37 P.3d 1112, recognizing "a measure of
discretion," id. at f l l , granted district court judges when deciding whether an
easement exists. He asserts this "somewhat more deferential standard does not
apply where, as here, the material facts are undisputed,...." (Aplee.'s Br. at 2.)
Evans offers no support for this contention. The County agrees that the material
facts are undisputed, but disagrees that their settled status precludes granting
Judge Howard's application of the correct legal standard to the facts of this case "a
broad measure of discretion." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah
1998).
RESPONSE TO EVANS'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Evans states that "[i]t is undisputed that the parties intended to create the
Easement." (Aplee.'s Br. at 3 & 8-9.) As the County noted in its brief below,
however, it disputes ever intending to create Evans's easement1, but assumed it
was mutually approved for the limited purpose of its motion for summary
judgment, and, consequently, Evans's appeal thereof. (Aplee.'s Br., Utah Ct. App.
at 4 & 10 n.6.) The court of appeals addressed that assertion by stating that the
County accepted the reservation when it accepted and recorded the deed
conveying the Strip. See Evans v. Board of County Comm 'rs, 2004 UT App 256,
1

The County herein continues using the same terminology it employed in its opening
brief: "Evans's reservation" or "Evans's easement" refers to the exception and
reservation included in Evans's predecessor's quitclaim deed to the County, and the
"Strip" refers to the 120-foot-by-760-foot strip of property to the south of Pine Street.
(Aplt.'sBr. at 2-6.)

TffilO & 12 n.5, 97 P.3d 697. To the extent the court of appeals's decision means
that a county's mere ministerial recordation of a deed signifies acceptance, the
County disputes the court's conclusion. However, that issue is not presented here.
The Course of Proceedings
Evans lists several reasons the district court found his reservation invalid
(Aplee.'s Br. at 4), yet the narrower issue presented here is whether his reservation
was sufficiently specific (Aplt.'s Br. at 1). The County's argument focuses on
what it terms the second portion of the reservation, a right of way "over and
across" (Aplt.'s Br. at 5) the Strip between Pine Street and Evans's property.
(Aplt.'s Br. at 6-7.) Thus, while Judge Howard's conclusion that "there exists no
physical improvement, fixture, or use of Pine Street occurring since the dedication
of the Ironton Subdivision Plat 75 years ago" (Aplt.'s Br. at A42) has little bearing
on this appeal, his finding that he was "unable to discern from the deed a location
for an easement and [could not] reasonably discern a proper place to fix the
location of the easement by virtue of existing fixtures" (Aplt.'s Br. at A42) is
relevant to the lack of specificity of Evans's reservation.
Further, the County disputes Evans's claim that "[t]he question presented
does not include the Court of Appeals' rulings on the statute of frauds ...."
(Aplee.'s Br. at 6.) The court of appeals's statute of frauds analysis was based in
part on the requirement in Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n,
899 P.2d 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), that language granting an easement must be
certain and definite. See Evans, 2004 UT App 256, 1J9, 97 P.3d 697. Since the
issue presented here is, in part, whether Evans's reservation of easement "was
sufficiently specific to be enforceable" (Aplt.'s Br. at 1), it encompasses both the
question of vagueness and the requirements of the statute of frauds.
Statement of Facts
Although Evans accepts the County's recitation of facts material to this

appeal (Aplee.'s Br. at 7), he adds his interpretation of the language of his
predecessor's quitclaim deed, including his conclusion that the reserved easement
"runs across the 120-foot width of the Strip ..." (Aplee.'s Br. at 8). Because
Evans later argues, based on this language, that the easement's length is 120 feet
(Aplee.'s Br. at 29), the County must note that the reservation's actual language
locates the easement "over and across" the Strip. (Aplt.'s Br. at 5.) Nothing in the
reservation suggests a straight line was contemplated.
The County also takes exception to Evans's unwarranted accusation that the
County's decision to vacate several platted but unopened streets in the Ironton Plat
was "no doubt ... an effort to clean up the legalities of the situation ...." (Aplee.'s
Br. at 9.) His citation to the Record provides no support for his statement, and his
attack on the County's motivations obscures the narrow issue presented here.
ARGUMENT
I.

UNDER UTAH LAW, EVANS'S EXPRESS EASEMENT IS VOID
BECAUSE IT FAILS TO SUFFICIENTLY SPECIFY ITS
DIMENSIONS AND LOCATION.
Although Evans concedes his reservation is "[inadequately [djefined"

(Aplee.'s Br. at 11), he contends, based primarily upon his reading of
extrajurisdictional law , that "the established rule in American law is that an
express easement is valid even if the deed fails to specify its dimensions or
location on the servient estate."

(Aplee.'s Br. at 11.)

Evans overstates his

contention.
While it appears that some jurisdictions have adopted that relaxed approach,
the opinions are hardly unanimous. More importantly, Evans offers no persuasive
2

Of the sixty-nine cases listed in Evans's Table of Authorities, only fourteen are from
Utah. (Aplee.'s Br. at iii-vi.)

evidence that Utah courts apply the more lenient standard. In fact, an examination
of Utah decisions, like Potter v. Chadaz, 1999 UT App 95, 977 P.2d 533, reveals
that Utah courts require a reservation or grant of an express easement to
sufficiently specify its dimensions and location.

Therefore, because Evans's

reservation of "a 56 foot wide right-of-way over and across [the Strip], from Pine
Street to connect with the grantor's remaining property" (Aplt.'s Br. at 5) fails to
meet this requirement, it is unenforceable.
(a)

The dimensions and location of an express easement are material
terms.

Evans does not dispute that Utah courts employ contract construction
principles to interpret express easements, and labels the County's recitation that
the absence of sufficiently specific essential terms renders a contract void
"unremarkable." (Aplee.'s Br. at 27.) Though unclear, it appears Evans bases his
opposition primarily on the idea that the dimensions and location of an express
easement are not essential terms. He errs in that assessment.
The clearest Utah decision to identify the boundaries and location of an
express easement as essential terms is Potter. There, the court of appeals held that
a reservation for a road over the east sixty-six feet of the conveyed property was
not sufficiently specific because it did not "specify the boundaries of the easement
or its exact location." Potter, 1999 UT App 95, f l l , 977 P.2d 533. Although he
does not dispute the County's interpretation of Potter, Evans dismisses the holding
as erroneous dictum because the decision goes on to address the concept of a
"stranger to the deed," reaffirming that the doctrine precludes a reservation for the
benefit of a third party. (Aplee.'s Br. at 24-26.) Evans's analysis is inverted:
assuming either analysis constitutes dictum (the County suggests neither is, for
reasons explained below), it is the "stranger to the deed" discussion, not the

analysis invalidating the easement as "not sufficiently detailed." Potter, 1999 UT
App95,1|ll,977P.2d533.
After the Potter court held that the reservation's "vague language d[id] not
constitute a definite and ascertainable description of the property/' id., it
continued:

"[h]owever, even if we were to assume that this language were

sufficient to create an express easement/' the stranger to the deed doctrine would
preclude enforcement. Id. at f 12 (emphasis added). Consequently, if one of these
analyses constitutes a statement "concerning some rule of law or legal proposition
not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand ...."
Black's Law Dictionary ASA (6th ed. 1990) (defining "dictum"), it is Potter's
ensuing stranger to the deed analysis, built upon the false assumption that the
easement language was sufficient.
A more accurate way to view Potter, however, is stating alternative reasons
for nullifying the easement at issue, meaning that neither the insufficient
specificity nor the stranger to the deed analyses should be considered dictum.
Where the opinion accompanying a decision invoked as a
precedent states several reasons for the decision, although a single
reason would have been sufficient to support the holding reached,
none of the reasons indicated is to be considered as a mere dictum;
rather, each is to be treated as a precedent embraced by stare decisis.
20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 154 (2004) (footnote omitted).
Though less clear than Potter, both Warburton v. Virginia Beach Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass 'n, 899 P.2d 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), and Southland Corp. v. Potter,
760 P.2d 320 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), also support the conclusion that the
dimensions and location of an express easement are essential terms. Evans's
declaration that Southland's relevance is "a mystery" since the attempted easement
at issue there suffered from multiple deficiencies (Aplee.'s Br. at 28) ignores the

court's conclusion that the alleged easement-creating document's "range of
meanings demonstrates that the writing lacks essential terms and provisions, ...."
Southland, 760 P.2d at 322. While Warburton focused on the distinct question of
whether the contract for country club membership at issue there sufficiently
described an interest in real property to create an easement under the statute of
frauds, that attention does not render the decision inapposite, as Evans suggests.
(Aplee.'s Br. at 27-28.)

Evans does not challenge the Warburton court's

endorsement of the requirement that interests in property like express easements
must sufficiently specify their boundaries. See Warburton, 899 P.2d at 781 n.4.
The County also cited several Utah decisions in its opening brief evaluating
conveyances of fee interests in deed and nondeed contexts (which, Evans does not
dispute, require sufficiently specific boundary descriptions to be valid) as
analogous support for similarly requiring grants or reservations of express
easements in Utah to likewise sufficiently specify their boundaries and locations.
(Aplt.'s Br. at 13-16.) Evans appreciates no such similarity between the two, and
attempts to distinguish those cases simply by noting what the County already had
acknowledged: that they do not deal with easements. (Aplee.'s Br. at 27-28.) Yet,
this analogy is not without precedent. See, e.g., North Shore, Inc. v. Wakefield,
530 N.W. 2d 297, 300 (N.D. 1995) ("[Exceptions or reservations of property in a
deed should be set forth with the same prominence as the property granted and
should be so explicit as to leave no room for doubt."); Vrabel v. Donahoe Creek
Watershed Auth, 545 S.W. 2d 53, 54 (Tex. Cir. App. 1976) ("The rule relating to
the sufficiency of descriptions of easements is the same as that required in
conveyances of land."); Chesapeake Corp. v. McCreery, 216 S.E. 2d 22, 25 (Va.
1975) ("The same principle [as that applied to deeds] is applicable to the
description excepting or reserving certain property from the operation of a
conveyance.").

Indeed, the County's analysis matches that of the authoritative legal
encyclopedia American Jurisprudence:

"The grant [of an easement] should

identify an easement's location with specificity. In other words, the description of
the easement requires a certainty such that a surveyor can go on the land and
locate the easement from such description."3

25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and

Licenses in Real Property § 64 (2004) (footnotes omitted).4
Decisions in several states bolster this perspective. For example, in Oliver
v. Ernul, 178 S.E. 2d 393 (N.C. 1971), the North Carolina Supreme Court held a
right-of-way agreement between several parties void. The court concluded the
writing (which described a twenty-foot right of way between a railway and a
highway, located by the boundaries of several plats identified by owner) was
insufficient. The court held that "the location of the '20-foot rightaway' on the
ground is vague, indefinite and uncertain. The language of the instrument vaguely
describes the intended easement in such a manner that nothing can be located on

3

Grants and reservations of express easements are treated equally under Utah law.
See Brown v. Christopher, 247 P. 503, 504-05 (Utah 1926) ("CA reservation of an
easement in the deed by which the lands are conveyed is equivalent, for the purpose
of the creation of the easement, to an express grant of the easement by the grantee of
the lands.'" (quoting Wagner v. Hanna, 38 Cal. 111)).
4

Although Evans's passing reference to American Jurisprudence (Aplee.'s Br. at 11)
appears contradictory, a closer examination reveals that he has modified the language
he quotes. Without the modification, it is, at best, unclear whether it supports his
assertion. The complete paragraph states: "The writing must contain a description of
the land that is to be subjected to the easement with sufficient clarity to locate it with
reasonable certainty. However, it is not necessary to designate with definiteness the
part of the land to which the right attaches." 25 Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses
in Real Property § 15 (2004) (footnotes omitted). In context, particularly with the
specific language from the subsequent section quoted above, "the land that is to be
subjected to the easement" likely means the servient estate, and the "land to which the
right attaches" the dominant.

the ground. The description contains no beginning and no ending." Id. at 597.
Quoting extensively from a prior North Carolina case, the court explained that
descriptions so vague and indefinite that they cannot be placed without resorting
to circumstances not referred to in the writing itself suffer from patent ambiguities,
and are void.
When an easement is created by deed, either by express grant or by
reservation, "the description thereof must not be so uncertain, vague
and indefinite as to prevent identification with reasonable certainty....
If the description is so vague and indefinite that effect cannot be
given the instrument without writing new material language into it,
then it is void and ineffectual either as a grant or as a reservation."
Id. at 597 (quoting Thompson v. Umberger, 19 S.E. 2d 484, 485 (N.C. 1942)).
In Highway Properties v. Dollar Savings Bank, 431 S.E. 2d 95 (W. Va.
1993), the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found a purported reservation
invalid. The language at issue deeded "'common parking and rights-of-way or
easements in, to and across all parcels for ingress and egress from and to all other
parcels/"

Id. at 97 (quoting deed).

The court held this language "totally

inadequate," id. at 99, noting that "[n]one of the easement language identified the
location or width of the easements on the land.

The descriptions contained

nothing that would serve to specify in the slightest degree any means of
geographically locating the easements on the property," id. at 100. Similarly, in
Vrabel v. Donahoe Creek Watershed Auth., 545 S.W. 2d 53 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976),
the court found a grant of an easement of 111 acres out of a 250.5-acre tract void.
The court reversed the trial court's decision fixing the easement's location, relying
upon "the well established rule that for a contract to convey land to be sufficient,
the description must be so definite and certain upon the face of the instrument
itself, or, in some writing referred to, that the land can be identified with
reasonable certainty." Id. at 54. The court elaborated that "[t]he description

requires a certainty such that a surveyor can go upon the land and locate
the easement from such description." Id. Other jurisdictions have held likewise.5
Evans relies heavily on Bruce and Ely's The Law of Easements

and

Licenses in Land ("The Law of Easements") throughout his brief for the indefinite
proposition that "'failure to indicate the easement's dimensions or its location on
the servient property usually is not fatal to the contemplated servitude.'" (Aplee.'s
Br. at 11 (quoting Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and
Licenses in Land § 7:2 (West 2005) (emphasis omitted)).)6

In fact, Evans's

footnote five and his assessment of Berg v. Ting, 850 P.2d 1349 (Wash. Ct. App.
1993), overruled, 886 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1995), are recited from the treatise, as
modified by the supplement, virtually verbatim. (Compare Aplee.'s Br. at 11-12
& n.5 with Bruce & Ely, supra, § 7:2.) Yet, further examination reveals that the
jurisdictions employing the "usual" approach apply rules of construction when
interpreting easements distinct from those used in Utah.
After stating that failing to indicate its dimensions or location is not usually
fatal to an easement, Bruce and Ely explain that "[t]he generally accepted view is
that extrinsic evidence may be used to identify the location and dimensions of the
5

See Kohl Indus. Park Co. v. County of Rockland, 710 F.2d 895, 903 (2d Cir. 1983)
("When a prospective purchaser seeks to acquire an easement, New York courts
require that party to identify with specificity the location and intended use for the
estate."); Parkinson v. Board of Assessors, 481 N.E. 2d 491, 493 (Mass. 1985)
("[T]he instrument must be sufficiently precise that 'a surveyor can go upon the land
and locate the easement.'" (quoting Vrabel, 545 S.W. 2d at 54)); Germany v.
Murdock, 662 P.2d 1346, 1348 (N.M. 1983) ("An easement requires the same
accuracy of description as other conveyances. 'The description requires a certainty
such that a surveyor can go upon the land and locate the easement from such
description.'" (quoting Vrabel, 545 S.W. 2d at 54)).
6

As a courtesy, the County includes a copy of pertinent portions of The Law of
Easements in the Addendum hereto.

n,

easement." Bruce & Ely, supra, § 7:2 (footnote omitted). Evans does not dispute,
however, that, under contract law, Utah courts resort to extrinsic evidence only
when they find an ambiguity. (Aplt.'s Br. at 10-11.) As the County has shown, an
omission of an express easement's dimensions or location does not render it
ambiguous, but rather unenforceable. Herein, then, lies the distinction between
the cases Evans relies upon and Utah law: While the jurisdictions Evans cites
apparently allow the admission of extrinsic evidence to determine an easement's
dimensions and location, Utah courts cannot consider such evidence absent
finding an ambiguity in the conveyance language, and omission of material terms
does not create an ambiguity.
Moreover, although Evans ignores it, Bruce and Ely expressly acknowledge
several jurisdictions that reject the analysis he advocates. "North Carolina courts,"
they note, "take a significantly more restrictive approach to the description issue,
holding that an easement grant or reservation is void for uncertainty if it does not
adequately describe the location of the easement." Bruce & Ely, supra, § 7:6
(footnote omitted).

The Law of Easements also recognizes New Mexico, Texas,

West Virginia, and Wyoming (which has enacted statutory requirements of
sufficiency, see Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-141) as other jurisdictions employing a
stricter standard for requiring descriptions of the dimensions and location of an
express easement in the creating instrument. See id. Based upon the foregoing
analysis, Utah squarely fits among these jurisdictions.
Evans repeatedly cites to Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property Law
("Utah Real Property Law") to support his argument that an express easement's
Indeed, in some jurisdictions even an ambiguity will nullify the easement. See 25
Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 18 (2004) ("[T]here is
authority holding that a provision purporting to grant an easement must be strictly
construed, with any doubt being resolved against establishment of the easement."
(footnotes omitted)).
in

failure to sufficiently specify its dimensions or location does not render it void.
(Aplee.'s Br. at 1, 26, 30.) He relies on the work for the "general rule" that the
owner of a servient estate has "the first opportunity to set the scope of an
inadequately described easement." If the dominant estate owner disagrees, the
o

treatise continues, she or he then may seek recourse from the courts.

David A.

Thomas & James H. Backman, Thomas and Backman on Utah Real Property Law
§ 12.02(c) (LEXIS 1999) (footnote omitted)9; (Aplee.'s Br. at 1, 26, 30). Evans's
reliance on this secondary source is unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First,
this language from Utah Real Property Law cites to no authority other than
another publication by the same authors. See Thomas & Backman, supra, §
12.02(c). Second, the text does not identify what it means by "an inadequately
described easement." Id. This language appears subsequent to the unambiguous
statement that, "[i]f based on an explicit grant, the extent of an easement is
determined by the grant," id. (footnote omitted), and a discussion of ambiguous
writings.

Thus, the authors could be referring to ambiguous, rather than

o

Oddly, this approach differs from that suggested by Evans. Under Evans's
proposal, a servient owner would have an unspecified amount of time to locate the
easement; failing to do so, the dominant owner would then have an unspecified time
to locate it; and, finally, upon disagreement or both parties' failure to locate it, a court
would do so. (Aplee.'s Br. at 30-31.)
9

Again, as a courtesy, the County includes a copy of pertinent portions of Utah Real
Property Law in the Addendum hereto.

insufficiently specific, descriptions.
(b)

Evans's reservation was not sufficiently specific.

Although Evans contends "[t]he real question" posed on appeal is not
whether his reserved easement was valid, but rather "how to properly define and
locate" it (Aplee.'s Br. at 16), the County finds the issue formulated by this Court
definitive:

Was Evans's reservation "sufficiently specific to be enforceable"

(Order Granting Cert. Nov. 5, 2004)? Since Evans's reservation cannot overcome
this threshold hurdle, his recitation of various rules of construction gleaned from
jurisdictions allowing the admission of extrinsic evidence to define an easement's
dimensions and location is surplusage.
Classifying this appeal as "an easy case," Evans argues that his reservation
is sufficiently specific because it identifies its purpose, the dominant and servient
estates, the grantor's intent to reserve11, the County's acceptance, and the
In some respects, it appears that those jurisdictions upon which Evans relies to
construct his rule allowing grantees the first opportunity to select the placement of
the easement may be operating under a holdover from the common law canons of
deed interpretation. "Although a number of early cases applied a common-law
canon of construction under which, to overcome uncertainty as to the land
conveyed, the grantee was allowed to select the land conveyed but not located, this
rule of construction has been seldom cited in modern times." 23 Am. Jur. 2d
Deeds § 43 (2004) (footnote omitted).
11

Throughout the briefing of this case, Evans has inferred a broad interpretation of
the parties' "intent" in creating Evans's easement. (Aplee.'s Br. at 20, 21, 28-29;
Resp't's Br., Pet. for Cert, at 3-4, 7; Aplt.'s Br., Utah Ct. App. at 4, 6, 8.)
However, in the context of interpreting real property transactions in Utah, the term
has a narrow meaning. In Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979), this Court
explained that "the main object in construing a deed is to ascertain the intention of the
parties, especially that of the grantor, from the language used"' Id. at 656 (emphasis
original) (footnote omitted). The Court continued: "[T]he term 'intention,' as
applied to the construction of a deed, is to be distinguished from its usual connotation.
When so applied, it is a term of art and signifies a meaning of the writing." Id.
(emphases original) (footnote omitted).

easement's width. (Aplee.'s Br. at 29.) However, the only item in this list that
begins to identify the essential terms of the easement's dimensions and location is
its width, and that is insufficient. The face of the deed reveals that it purports to
reserve "a 56 foot wide right-of-way over and across the [Strip]," which measures
120 feet by 760 feet, for a total of 91,200 square feet, or a little more than two
acres. (Aplt.'s Br. at 2.) Without more, it is impossible to locate or even define
the extent of this attempted easement.

All that is known is that Evans's

predecessor attempted to reserve a fifty-six-foot-wide access between his and the
County's properties that crosses more than two acres following an unknown path.
The possible points of beginning and ending and paths the easement could follow
approach innumerable.
It is exactly this sort of indefmiteness that prompted the Potter court to find
the reservation in that case unenforceable. There, the court rejected an attempted
reservation of a sixty-six-foot-wide road between an identified street and the
seller's property over the eastern portion of an approximately one-and-a-half-acre
parcel as insufficiently specific. See Potter, 1999 UT App 95,1fl[l0-ll & 14-15,
977 P.2d 533. The court of appeals's conclusion compels a similar finding here
because Evans's description is even less definite. The Potter language identified
the right of way's width, the servient and dominant estates, and even the general
area on the servient estate where it should be located.

Evans's attempted

reservation provides no guidance where it should be located over an even larger
area.
In an effort to escape the persuasive effect of Potter, Evans suggests his
reservation is more specific, conjecturing a length of 120 feet, equal to the Strip's
width. (Aplee.'s Br. at 26 n.14, 29.) Evans presents no evidence, however, that
the parties intended a straight-line path over the Strip, that the plain meaning of
the reservation requires a straight path, or even that such a path was feasible when

the easement was created. The easement language actually reserves a right of way
"over and across" the Strip. (Aplt.'s Br. at 5.) This phrase could mean a diagonal
line running from the northwest corner of the Strip to the southeast corner, or the
reverse, or anything in between.

It could begin anywhere along the northern

boundary of the Strip and end anywhere along its southern boundary. Nothing in
the reservation suggests a straight line, and any of these other paths would create
an easement longer than the 120-foot width of the Strip.
Looking again to Utah courts5 application of contract principles in the
analogous context of deeds for guidance, it is clear that this degree of vagueness
renders such conveyances unenforceable. As with easements, Utah law requires
the boundaries of conveyed parcels to be described with sufficient specificity.
See, e.g., Colman v. Butkovich, 556 P.2d 503, 505 (Utah 1976) ("It is not to be
questioned that in order to be valid, the deed must contain a sufficiently definite
description to identify the property it conveys." (footnote omitted)). "'In the
construction of boundaries, we ... find that the intention of the parties is the
controlling consideration.'"

Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, f28, 44 P.3d 781

(quoting Losee v. Jones, 235 P.2d 132, 137 (Utah 1951)).

This Court

"determine[s] the parties' intent from the plain language of the four corners of the
deed." Id. at %3S.

In Ault, this Court held a boundary description that failed to close
sufficiently specific after finding that several surveyors had been able to establish
the parcel's boundaries based upon the deed's legal description. See id. at ^fi|2627, 30. Yet, in Howard v. Howard, 367 P.2d 193 (Utah 1962), this Court affirmed
a district court's nullification of a deed where the description of the parcel's
boundaries not only failed to close, but provided no indication that closure from
the last described call was even intended. See id. at 194-95. Consequently, this

Court concluded that the only way to ascertain the grantor's intent was by
conjecture, which could have led to "any number of areas." Id. at 195.
Evans's easement resembles the situation in Howard. His reservation's
failure to identify its points of beginning and ending, length, and path leave far
more unknown than, in a deed context, an erroneously short call manifestly
intended to close a parcel's boundary description.

By suggesting, without

evidence, that the length of his easement is 120 feet, Evans effectually illustrates
that he must resort to conjecture in order to locate it, a concept explicitly rejected
in Howard.
II.

EVANS'S INSUFFICIENT ATTEMPT TO RESERVE AN EXPRESS
EASEMENT DID NOT CREATE A FLOATING OR ROVING
EASEMENT.
Evans argues that a reservation that fails to specify an easement's location

or dimensions is an enforceable floating or roving easement. (Aplee.'s Br. at 1415.) He presents no controlling authority, however, that permits such an exception
to the rules of construction outlined above.

Moreover, construing Evans's

easement as floating or roving contradicts the parties' intent as manifested by the
reservation's plain language.
(a)

Floating easements are not exempt
requirements of express easements.

from

the

specificity

Because the location and dimensions of an express easement are essential
terms, Evans's argument that reservations lacking these terms are enforceable in
Utah as floating or roving easements implies an exempt status. He points to two
Utah cases for support: Wood v. Ashby, 253 P.2d 351 (Utah 1952), and Salt Lake
City v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc. ("Walker"), 253 P.2d 365 (Utah 1953). (Aplee.'s
Br. at 20-21.) Neither decision supports Evans's proposition.
Evans decrees that "Wood refutes the County's position that an easement is

void because its location is not specified in the deed" (Aplee.'s Br. at 22), yet he
concedes that "[t]he issue in Wood was whether the easement should be assigned a
reasonable location and boundaries or whether it was a general and unrestricted
right of way covering the entire strip"

io

(Aplee.'s Br. at 21). In other words,

Evans agrees that the threshold issue of whether the reservation was void was not
before the Court in Wood. Nothing in Wood hints that the issue was ever raised.
In fact, the decision makes clear that the question was prompted by the
defendants' use of part of the easement property for farming, not a dispute over
whether it existed. See Wood, 253 P.2d at 353. Moreover, given the passage of at
least thirty years from the original reservation to the initiation of the action, see id.
at 352 (dating the original reservation sometime prior to 1917 and the suit
sometime after 1947), it is entirely possible that the parties and the Court
considered the question within the context of a prescriptive, rather than express,
easement.13 See Potter, 1999 UT App 95, |17, 977 P.2d 533.
To resolve the question of whether the reservation was unrestricted, the
Court resorted to the doctrine of practical construction, see Wood, 253 P.2d at
353-54, a tool of contract interpretation employed in Utah only after a court
determines that an ambiguity exists. See, e.g., Webbank v. American Gen. Annuity
Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, f 19, 54 P.3d 1139 ("If a contract is ambiguous, the court
may consider the parties' actions and performance as evidence of the parties' true
intention."). That analysis is inapposite here, where the focus instead is on an
12

Though the meaning appears similar, the County prefers the Court's statement of
the issue: "The issue is whether [the] deed reserved to the grantor a general and
unrestricted right of way over strip A." Wood, 253 P.2d at 353.
I T

There exist many other reasons why the issue might not have been raised. It might
have been in the parties' mutual interest to agree that the easement existed. It could
also have been oversight. Regardless, the point remains that the easement's existence
was not questioned.

initial assessment of the reservation's enforceability.
The incongruity between Evans's reliance on Wood and his criticism of the
County's reliance on Potter further emphasizes his argument's weakness. While
taking issue with the County's reliance on what he characterizes as Potter's dictum
expressly holding a reservation void for failing to specify its location and
dimensions (Aplee.'s Br. at 25-26), he simultaneously construes Wood's omission
of "any suggestion that the easement might be void for lack of specificity" as
supporting his conclusion that the lack of those terms does not render an easement
unenforceable (Aplee.'s Br. at 21). Evans offers no explanation why Wood's
silence should outweigh Potter's express holding.
Although Evans correctly notes that the grant of easement at issue in Walker
did not specifically fix its location or width (Aplee.'s Br. at 22), he misinterprets
the County's argument by concluding that the County would consider the
easement void. (Aplee.'s Br. at 23.) The Court in Walker did not, as Evans
suggests, uphold "a floating easement with inadequately defined terms." (Aplee.'s
Br. at 22.) The easement at issue in Walker was instead a sufficiently specific
floating easement. It granted "'a right of way and easement for all... conduits ... to
be constructed by the City wherever these may be located now or hereafter within
lands owned by' the grantor." Walker, 253 P.2d at 238 (quoting grant) (emphases
omitted). It therefore sufficiently specified a method by which the parties were to
determine the dimensions and location of the granted easement, an acceptable
construction under Utah contract law. (Aplt.'s Br. at 12-13.)
As specified in the grant, the city subsequently chose a location for the
water conduit, constructed it, and began operation in 1906. See Walker, 253 P.2d
at 368. Thus, the existence of the easement was not at issue. In fact, as with
Wood, there is no indication that the parties made any argument that the easement
itself was void.

Rather, the question raised was the extent of the implied

secondary easement for operation, repair, and maintenance of the conduit that the
city claimed was threatened by the defendant's excavation activities years later.14
See id. at 366-68. It is this secondary easement that the Court interprets as "of
such width as is reasonably necessary for full enjoyment of the easement granted."
Walker, 253 P.2d at 369. See also Conley v. Whittlesey, 985 P.2d 1127, 1133 n.l
(Idaho 1999) ("The term 'secondary easement' is applied to the right to enter and
repair and do those things necessary to the full enjoyment of the easement
existing."). Thus, Walker's determination of the extent of this incidental easement
does not suggest Evans's conclusion that Utah courts recognize and locate failed
attempts to create fixed easements.
Because neither Wood nor Walker excuse floating or roving easements from
the requirement imposed by Utah contract law that the dimensions and location of
express easements be sufficiently specified, the failure of Evans's reservation to
sufficiently specify these essential terms renders it void, regardless whether it
otherwise would be considered a floating or roving easement.
(b)

Floating easements are created when intended by the parties.

Assuming, arguendo, that Evans's reservation sufficiently specified its
dimensions and location, it still would not constitute a floating or roving easement
because it is clear from its language that the parties did not intend to create one.
Evans correctly notes that "[t]he paramount rule of construction of deeds is to give
effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the deed as a whole, ...."
Hancock v. Planned Dev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990); (Aplee.'s Br. at
20). Yet, he abandons that well-established precept by labeling the County's
14

"'The right to enter upon the servient tenement for the purpose of repairing or
renewing an artificial structure, constituting an easement, is called a 'secondary
easement,' a mere incident of the easement that passes by express or implied grant, or
is acquired by prescription.'" Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Webb, 84 S.E. 2d 735,
739 (Va. 1954) (quoting 2 Thompson, Real Property (Perm. Ed.), § 676, p.343).

argument that floating easements are created only when intended as "novel"
(Aplee.'s Br. at 13), and asserting that all that is required to create a floating
easement is "that the location and/or dimensions of the easement be inadequately
defined" (Aplee.'s Br. at 14). This inconsistency results from Evans's overbroad
definition of floating easements.
Evans criticizes the County's reliance on Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v.
Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618 (Utah 1989), to support its argument that a
floating easement is created when the parties intend then-unpredictable
circumstances to fix the easement's dimensions and location by dismissing the
decision's language as tangential dictum strictly limited to the facts of the case.
(Aplee.'s Br. at 23-24.) Regardless its status, Flying Diamond's description of
the easements at issue in that case as floating, and explaining that they were
defined by unpredictable circumstances, see Flying Diamond, 776 P.2d at 626,
offers persuasive support for the County's interpretation. Moreover, the similarity
tying together the floating easements at issue in Flying Diamond and Walker is the
parties' clear intent to allow the unpredictable circumstances specified in the
creating instruments to set the easements' boundaries and locations. In Walker, it
was the city's subsequent location and construction of a water conduit.

See

Walker, 253 P.2d at 368. In Flying Diamond, it was the location of wells, roads,
and other facilities to locate, remove, and transport oil or gas.

See Flying

Diamond, 116 P.2d at 626. Hence, in both Walker and Flying Diamond the parties
intended the dimensions and location of the easements to remain undefined until
they were fixed by the mechanisms identified in the creating instruments.
In contrast, Evans's easement clearly demonstrates the parties' intent to
reserve a fixed, not floating, easement. The reservation language does not tie the
location or dimensions of the contemplated easement to the eventual location of
any structures, the discovery of mineral deposits, or anything similar. Rather, the

language clearly indicates an intent to reserve "a 56 foot wide right-of-way over
and across" the Strip. (Aplt.'s Br. at 5.) Therefore, giving effect to the parties'
intent as manifested in the reservation militates against a finding of a floating
easement here.
The impossibility of using any of the four Walker factors the court of
appeals instructed the district court to employ on remand to set Evans's
easement's dimensions and location, see Evans, 2004 UT App 256, f22, 97 P.3d
697, also illustrates that it is not a floating easement.

Walker outlined four

methods to fix floating easements: (1) agreement of the parties; (2) acquiescent
use; (3) right of selection as specified in the grant; or (4) necessity. See Walker,
253 P.2d at 368. First, the parties do not agree where the easement should be
located.

See Evans, 2004 UT App 256, \6, 97 P.3d 697 (noting the end of

unfruitful settlement discussions). Second, there has been no acquiescent use.
(Aplt.'s Br. at 2-3.) Third, the reservation does not vest a right of selection in
either party. It requires the County to build a road over it, but does not give it the
right to locate it. (Aplt.'s Br. at 5.) Finally, Evans has never claimed that the
easement must be located in a particular place "because any other place would
annul, ruin, or militate against the grant."

Walker, 253 P.2d at 368. Indeed,

Evans's statement that he "has no objection to the County selecting a reasonable
location on the Strip for placement of the Easement" (Aplee.'s Br. at 30) would
contradict such an assertion.
Additionally, none of the four Walker methods for fixing a floating
easement's location fit within "the course [Evans contends] this Court should
mandate on remand." (Aplee.'s Br. at 31.) According to Evans, this Court should
order the district court to allow the County to select a location for the easement
within a reasonable time. Failing that, Evans would get to choose his easement's
location. Finally, if the parties could not agree, the district court would locate the

easement using the standard for the extent of secondary easements. (Aplee.'s Br.
at 30-31.) This approach, however, does not rely on agreement by the parties,
acquiescent use, a right of selection vested by the grant, or the requirement of
necessity as defined in Walker. Thus, Evans's proposition actually diverges from
the instructions of the court of appeals. Because Evans has filed no cross-appeal,
his request is improper.
Evans's references to The Law of Easements, Corpus Juris Secundum, and
Black's Law Dictionary for definitions of floating easements are inapposite.
(Aplee.'s Br. at 12.) Summarized, they all state that undesignated grants of rights
of way may be termed floating easements. These definitions fit both Evans's and
the County's interpretations. Moreover, a review of the case law upon which
Evans relies tends to support the County's interpretation.
In Los Angeles v. Howard, 53 Cal. Rptr. 274 (Cal. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966),
and the cases listed in footnote six of Evans's brief (most of which also appear in a
footnote in The Law of Easements, see Bruce & Ely, supra, § 7:4 n.l), the term
was used the same way the County argues it has been used in Utah case law: The
parties intended to create an easement, the dimensions and location of which were
to be determined by a prescribed method, usually subject to unpredictable
circumstances. See Howard, 53 Cal. Rptr. 274, 276 (discussing a reservation
granting the city an easement "'for the purpose of operating, maintaining,
repairing and renewing [pjower lines for the conveyance of electricity'" (quoting
instrument)); Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Dickie, 73 P.3d 369, 370 (Wash.
2003) (regarding a grant of right of way to maintain irrigation laterals); Coughlin
v. Anderson, 853 A.2d 460, 464 (Conn. 2004) (addressing an exception and grant
"to install water, sewerage, gas and electrical conduits" over the property);
Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 853 (Wyo. 1996)
(analyzing an easement for constructing, operating, and maintaining electric

lines)1:>; New Orleans & Northeastern R.R. v. Morrison, 35 So. 2d 68, 69 (Miss.
1948) (reserving the use of land and timber on either side of the road "to be
constructed by" the railroad company); Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co.,
575 N.W. 2d 578, 579 (Minn. 1998) (involving an easement over the property
with rights of ingress and egress to construct and maintain gas pipelines); Missouri
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Argenbright, 457 S.W. 2d 777, 780 (Mo. 1970) (addressing an
easement sought by eminent domain to locate, construct, operate, and maintain
electric transmission wires).
In the only case Evans cites that presents a situation arguably similar to one
where the parties simply failed to specify an intended fixed easement, the court
found that the floating easement was valid because, unlike Evans's reservation, it
set forth one of the Walker methods for determining its location. See Umberger v.
Department of Game, Fish and Parks, 248 N.W. 2d 359, 397 (S.D. 1976) ("The
easement itself anticipated mutual agreement in establishing a more exact route,
...." (emphasis added)).
In Village of Wagon Mound v. Mora Trust, 62 P.3d 1255 (N.M. Ct. App.
2002), cited by Evans (Aplee.'s Br. at 13 n.6), the New Mexico Court of Appeals
endorsed a narrow definition of a floating easement similar to that used by this
Court in Walker and Flying Diamond. In Wagon Mound, the grant provided an
easement for waterworks across particularly described land "'as said works, water
intake and pipe line may be located by the engineers'" of the village. Wagon
Mound, 62 P.3d at 1265 (quoting indenture). After locating the pipeline, the grant
provided that the grantor would execute and deliver another deed conveying the
rights of way by definite description. However, although the pipeline was built,
the deed with definite descriptions was never delivered.
1:>

See id. at 1265.

The court concluded, in part, that "the parties intended a floating easement at the
time the easement was executed." Id. at 855 (emphasis added).

Concluding that the parties' intent was "undisputed," the court found "no conflict
with prior case law or New Mexico policy in recognizing the validity of an
undescribed, or 'floating' easement in these circumstances." Id. at 1266. "[T]hese
circumstances" being the creation of an easement to be located by one of the
parties via its construction a water pipeline, much as in the case of Walker. In
other words, the parties' clear intent to create a floating easement, and the
inclusion of a method for fixing it in the creating instrument, allowed the court to
recognize an enforceable floating easement.
Moreover, Bruce and Ely's treatise also notes that floating easements
"burden the entire servient estate and therefore tend to hamper development, limit
financing possibilities, and impede alienation of the property." Bruce & Ely,
supra, § 7:7 (footnote omitted). Since, in Utah, "[t]he accepted rule is that... the
easement conveyed should be so construed as to burden the servient estate only to
the degree necessary to satisfy the purpose described in the grant," Weggeland v.
Ujifusa, 384 P.2d 590, 591 (Utah 1963) (footnote omitted), the presumption
should be that the parties did not intend to create such a burden.
III.

MAINTAINING A CONSISTENT APPROACH TO INTERPRETING
CONVEYANCES AND A STRICT DEFINITION OF FLOATING OR
ROVING EASEMENTS PROMOTES CLARITY AND JUDICIAL
ECONOMY.
Evans argues that his suggestion for placing the easement in question

(which, as noted above, contradicts the court of appeals's order) "is the only
course that makes sense and does not lead to serious inequities" because he
"purchased his property with the reasonable expectation that the Easement was
valid, and his development plans have long depended on that expectation." He
further asserts that "[vjoiding the Easement, as the County now advocates, would
impose an economic hardship on [him]." (Aplee.'s Br. at 31.) Evans offers no

support from the record for these claims of detrimental effect or reliance, which
seem at least questionable given that the original conveyance from his predecessor
made no mention of the reservation until the corrected quitclaim deed was filed
over five years later. (R. at 300-298, 411-10.)
The prejudice to the courts and the parties to such insufficiently described
easements that would result from

adopting Evans's proposed rules of

interpretation is clear and well established. Both The Law of Easements and Utah
Real Property Law direct their readers to define carefully the dimensions and
locations of express easements.

See Bruce & Ely, supra, § 7:1 ("When an

easement is created by express provision, the drafters should take care to specify
precisely the location and dimensions of the easement." (footnote omitted));
Thomas & Backman, supra, § 12.02(b)(1) ("To avoid future litigation the
draftsman must use great care to identify clearly and specifically: ... the limits,
permitted uses and duration of the easement." (footnote omitted)). The advice is
given to avoid what both authorities describe as frequent litigation on these
matters. Evans also acknowledges this problem and its drain on judicial resources,
noting that "[h]ow to fix the location or dimensions of an inadequately described
easement is a recurring question that often 'taxes the best resources of judicial
ingenuity.'" (Aplee.'s Br. at 16 (quoting Daniel v. Clarkson, 338 S.W. 2d 691,
692 (Ky. I960)).) See also Bruce & Ely, supra, § 7:6.
Nevertheless, apart from personal benefit, Evans offers no explanation why
Utah's courts should discard the requirement that the creation of an express
easement requires a sufficiently specific description of its dimensions and
location, or depart from a limited definition of floating easements. In the absence
of a compelling rationale for diverging from Utah precedent by endorsing
ambiguity and thereby increasing judicial involvement in these matters, the Court
should maintain these clear guidelines.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Evans's express easement is not sufficiently
specific to be enforceable, nor would it constitute a floating or roving easement if
it were. Consequently, Evans's reservation is void, and the decision of the court
of appeals should be reversed.
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§ 7:16
§ 7:17

§ 7:1

— S p e c i a l c a s e s of r e l o c a t i o n a b s e n t m u t u a l c o n s e n t
Change in dimensions

Introduction

Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Easements ®=>46
Once an e a s e m e n t h a s been created, difficulties often a r i s e
with respect to its location and dimensions. The mode of creation
bears on the resolution of these issues. 1 For example, if the easement was expressly created by grant or reservation, implied from
a plat, or formally condemned, the parties and the courts m a y
look to a written easement description for guidance. 2 If, however,
the easement arose by implication from a quasi-easement or by
prescription, no writing exists, but prior use serves as a starting
point for analysis. 3 Furthermore, if the easement is one of necessity, neither a written document nor, typically, prior use exists to
facilitate interpreting the scope of the easement. 4
When an easement is created by express provision, the drafters
should take care to specify precisely the location and dimensions
of the easement. 5 Too frequently, easement drafters fail to cover
one or more of these matters, or they treat location and dimension issues in an incomplete or ambiguous fashion. 6
§ 7:2

Location a n d d i m e n s i o n s of e x p r e s s e a s e m e n t s

Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Easements <3=*46
Drafters of express easements should include a legal descrip[Section 7:1]
1
See Wright v. Horse Creek Ranches, 697 P.2d 384, 388 (Colo. 1985); 3 R.
Powell, Powell on Real Property § 34.12 (1994).
2
See 3 R Powell, Powell on Real Property § 34 12 (1994) For t r e a t m e n t of
the specialized problem of condemning land on which to locate electric power
lines, see Eminent Domain: Review of Electric Power Company's Location of
Transmission Line For Which Condemnation is Sought, 19 A.L.R. 4th 1026.
3
See 3 R. Powell, Powell on Real Property §§ 34.12, 34.13 (1994).
4
Seeid. at §34.13.
5
Cunningham, Stoebuck, and Whitman, The Law of Property (2d ed.) § 8.9;
see generally Kratovil, Easement Draftsmanship and Conveyancing, 38 Cal. L.
Rev. 426 (1950), Extent and Reasonableness of Use of Private Way in Exercise
of Easement Granted in General T e r m s , 3 A.L.R. 3d 1256 (making drafting
suggestions). For a "Model Easement Grant," see Kratovil and Werner, Real
Estate Law 24-25 (9th ed )
6
Cunningham, Stoebuck, and Whitman, The Law of Property (2d ed ) § 8.9.
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tion of both the servient tenement and the precise portion of t h a t
tract over which the easement runs. 1 Although the instrument
must identify the servient estate, failure to indicate the easement's dimensions or its location on the servient property usually
is not fatal to the contemplated servitude. 2 The generally accepted view is that extrinsic evidence may be used to identify the
location and dimensions of the easement. 3 The easement dimension t h a t causes the most difficulty is width, but controversy as to
height or depth frequently arises indirectly in connection with
what constitutes reasonable use of a general right-of-way. 4
[Section 7:2]
^ a z e n , Easements From the Viewpoint of the Title Insurer, 15 Gal. St. BJ
28, 31 (1940). For a "Model Easement Grant/' see Kratovil and Werner, Real
E s t a t e Law 2 4 - 2 5 (9th ed.). See generally §3:1 (discussing requirements of
Statute of Frauds and noting that document creating easement must identify
servient tenement).
2
Harvey v. Bell, 292 Ark. 657, 660, 732 S.W.2d 138, 140 (1987); Howard v.
Cramlet, 56 Ark. App. 171, 174-175, 939 S.W.2d 858, 859-860 (1997); Colvin v.
Southern Cal. Edison Co., 194 Cal. App. 3d 1306, 1312, 240 Cal. Rptr. 142, 146
(2d Dist. 1987) (abrogated on other grounds, by Grnelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th
1095, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 847 P.2d 560 (1993)); Hynes v. City of Lakeland, 451
So. 2d 505, 511 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1984); Murdock v. Ward, 267 Ga.
303, 303-304, 477 S.E.2d 835, 836 (1996); Joseph Giddan & Sons v. Northbrook
Trust & Sav. Bank, 151 111. App. 3d 537, 541, 103 111. Dec. 440, 501 N.E.2d 757,
760 (1st Dist. 1986); Cheever v. Graves, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 605, 592 N.E.2d
758, 761 (1992); Hall v. Allen, 771 S.W.2d 50, 53 (Mo. 1989); Hoeischer v.
Simmerock, 921 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1996); Clements v.
Schultz, 200 A.D.2d 11, 13-14, 612 N.Y.S.2d 726, 727-728 (4th Dep't 1994);
Jones v. Fuller, 856 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex. App. Waco 1993); Wilheim v.
Beyersdorf, 100 Wash. App. 836, 844, 999 P.2d 54, 59 (Div. 3 2000); Berg v.
Ting, 68 Wash. App. 721, 727-730, 850 P.2d 1349, 1353-1355 (Div. 1 1993),
rev'd on other grounds, 125 Wash. 2d 544, 886 P.2d 564 (1995) ("[T]he location
of an easement, which need not be precisely described, is to be distinguished
from the location of the servient estate, which must be accurately described"
(emphasis in original)); see also § 3:1 (discussing application of Statute of Frauds
to creation of express easements). But see Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 505,
62 A.L.R.5th 847 (Wyo. 1994) ("Presently, Wyoming law requires specific
descriptions for easements recorded after May 20, 1981/'); Wyo. Stat. § 34-1-141
(easement created without specific location is void unless description of location
is recorded within one year of execution of easement).
3

See sources cited in § 7:6, note 3.
See § 8:4 (discussing propriety of placing utility poles or underground utilities on general right-of-way); see also Wright & Hester, Pipes, Wires, and
Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad
Easements From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Centuries, 27 Ecology LQ
351, 414, 415 (2000) (citing this treatise in connection with discussion of scope
of railroad easements).
4

d
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— E a s e m e n t s n o t subject to p r e c i s e l o c a t i o n

Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Easements <3^46
Certain servitudes cannot be located with precision. Easements
or profits for h u n t i n g a n d fishing or for o t h e r r e c r e a t i o n a l
purposes often entitle the holder to use the entire servient estate
and t h u s defy pinpoint description. 1 Such relatively indefinite
servitudes are regularly enforced, 2 apparently on the ground that
the parties' clear intent should be given effect. In such cases, the
owner of the servient estate is protected by the general principle
t h a t an easement holder cannot utilize the easement in an unreasonable manner. 3
§ 7:4

—Location or d i m e n s i o n s o m i t t e d or i n a d e q u a t e l y
described

Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Easements <§=>46
Express easements t h a t omit or inadequately describe the location or d i m e n s i o n s of t h e e a s e m e n t a r e commonplace. For
example, the i n s t r u m e n t creating the easement may provide for
the following:
1. "A right of way fifteen feet wide over X s farm";
[ S e c t i o n 7:3]
1
Bachman v. Hecht, 659 F. Supp. 308, 316-317 (D.V.I. 1986) (beach easement over entire parcels), judgment affd, 849 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1988) and judgment affd, 849 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1988); Cunningham, Stoebuck, and Whitman,
The Law of Property (2d ed.) § 8.1; see also Bruce v. Garges, 259 Ga. 268, 2 7 0 272, 379 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1989) (recreational e a s e m e n t to dry sand a r e a of
beach); Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196, 211-212 (Tex. 1962).
Hunting and fishing rights frequently are considered profits and enforced
as such. E.g., Hanson v. Fergus Falls Nat. Bank, 242 Minn. 498, 501-510, 65
N.W.2d 857, 860-865, 49 A.L.R.2d 1379 (1954); High v. Davis, 283 Qr. 315, 322,
584 P.2d 725, 730 (1978); Fairbrother v. Adams, 135 Vt. 428, 430-431, 378 A.2d
102, 104 (1977). See generally § 1:12 (discussing hunting and fishing profits).
2
E.g., U.S. v. 126.24 Acres of Land, More or Less, S i t u a t e in St. Clair
County, S t a t e of Mo., 572 F . Supp. 832, 834 (W.D. Mo. 1983); B a c h m a n v.
Hecht, 659 F. Supp. 308, 316-317 (D.V.I. 1986), judgment affd, 849 F.2d 599
(3d Cir. 1988) and judgment affd, 849 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1988); see also Mikesh
v. Peters, 284 N.W.2d 215, 217-219 (Iowa 1979); Cunningham, Stoebuck, and
Whitman, The Law of Property (2d ed.) § 8.1.
3
See § 8:10 (analyzing limitations on holder's use of easement); see also
Note, Property Owners Beware: The M i n n e s o t a S u p r e m e Court H a s Twice
"Misconstrued" Express Easements, 25 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1545, 1572 n.225,
1573 n.230 (1999) (citing and quoting this treatise).
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2. "A sewer line along the northern boundary of Lot 17"; or
3. "A pipeline easement across F s ranch."
Questions then arise as to the location of the easement (example
1), its dimensions (example 2), or both its location and dimensions (example 3). Unlocated easements (examples 1 and 3) are
often called floating easements. 1
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has identified an unusual type
of floating easement. 2 The court concluded t h a t a "mail patron
has a floating easement for the placement of a mailbox in the
right-of-way dedicated for 'public use/" 3 A mail patron, however,
cannot put a mailbox wherever the patron wishes on the servient
estate. 4
§ 7:5

D e s i g n a t i o n by parties

Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Easements <s=>46, 48(2)
Sometimes the easement instrument expressly provides t h a t
one of the parties has the right to select the location and dimen[Section 7:4]
1
"A 'floating easement' . . . is an easement . . . which, when created, is not
limited to any specific area on the servient tenement . . .". City of Los Angeles
v. Howard, 244 Cal. App. 2d 538, 541 n.l, 53 Cal. Rptr. 274, 276 n . l (2d Dist.
1966). See also Norris v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Works, 261 Cal. App. 2d
41, 48 n.4, 67 C a l Rptr. 595, 599 n.4 (3d Dist. 1968); Umberger v. State ex rel.
Dept. of Game, Fish and Parks, 248 N.W.2d 395, 397 (S.D. 1976); R.C.R., Inc. v.
Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 587 (Wyo. 1999) (citing this treatise); Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 855 (Wyo. 1996) ("An
express easement not stating the location and dimensions is called a floating
easement. . . ."); Hazen, Easements From the Viewpoint of the Title Insurer, 15
Cal. St. BJ 28, 32 (1940); Note, Real Property: The Effect of Floating Easements
Held by Pipeline Companies on Marketability of Title a n d Land Values, 37
Okla. L. Rev. 180, 180 (1984).
Floating e a s e m e n t s are also sometimes termed "blanket e a s e m e n t s " or
"roving easements." See Scherger v. Northern N a t u r a l Gas Co., 575 N.W.2d
578, 579 (Minn. 1998) ("blanket easement"); Missouri Public Service Co. v.
Argenbright, 457 S.W.2d 777, 780-783 (Mo. 1970) ("blanket easement"); Salt
Lake City v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 123 Utah 1, 8, 253 P.2d 365, 368 (1953)
("roving easement"); Note, Real Property: The Effect of Floating E a s e m e n t s
Held by Pipeline Companies on Marketability of Title and Land Values, 37
Okla. L. Rev. 180, 180 (1984) (mentioning alternative term "blanket easement").
2
Lawson v. Sipple, 319 Ark. 543, 551-554, 893 S.W.2d 757, 761-762 (1995).
3
Id. at 552, 893 S.W.2d at 761-762.
4
Id. at 552-554, 893 S.W.2d at 761-762. See § 7:5 (discussing designation by
parties of location of floating easement).
' West Group, 10/2001
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sions of an undescribed easement. 1 In such cases, the party holding the right to select must act reasonably, taking into consideration the needs of the easement holder or the burden imposed on
t h e servient e s t a t e , as t h e case may be. 2 The selection of t h e
easement's location a n d dimensions need not be in writing; it
may be accomplished orally or by use. 3 Notwithstanding this general principle, one court, citing public policy considerations, such
as safety, required a natural gas pipeline easement holder to record notice of the location it selected p u r s u a n t to the easement
instrument. 4
More commonly, the instrument is silent regarding the m a n n e r
by which t h e location and dimensions of an undescribed easement should be determined. Many jurisdictions take a practical
approach to this problem. In these states, the owner of the servient estate is entitled to designate a reasonable location for the
easement. 5 If the servient estate owner fails to m a k e such a
designation within a reasonable period, the easement holder may
TSection 7:5]
1
E.g., Sorrell v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 314 S.W.2d 193, 194 (Ky.
1958) (easement holder had right to select routes for gas pipelines); Larson v.
Amundson, 414 N.W.2d 413, 415-417 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (easement over
"road to be laid out" by servient estate owner); Marlow v. Mariow, 284 S.C. 155,
160, 325 S.E.2d 703, 706 (Ct. App. 1984) (discretion in servient estate owner to
designate location and width of access road) (disapproved of on other grounds,
by Jowers v. Hornsby, 292 S.C. 549, 357 S.E.2d 710 (1987)); Smith v. King, 27
Wash. App. 869, 870-871, 620 P.2d 542, 543, 24 A.L.R.4th 1049 (Div. 1 1980)
(right in easement holder to select location of road); Clearwater Realty Co. v.
Bouchard, 146 Vt. 359, 361-362, 505 A.2d 1189, 1190-1191 (1985) (owner of
servient estate had right to designate width and location of way).
2
See Texas E a s t e r n Transmission Corp. v. C a r m a n , 314 S.W.2d 684, 687
(Ky. 1958) (selection of location by easement holder); Marlow v. Marlow, 284
S.C. 155, 160, 325 S.E.2d 703, 706 (Ct. App. 1984) (selection of location by servient estate owner) (disapproved of on other grounds, by Jowers v. Hornsby, 292
S.C. 549, 357 S.E.2d 710 (1987)).
3
Smith v. King, 27 Wash. App. 869, 871, 620 P.2d 542, 543, 24 A.L.R.4th
1049 (Div. 1 1980) ("A deed is not required to establish the actual location of an
easement, but is required to convey an easement . . . " (emphasis in original));
see also Location of Easement of Way Created by Grant Which Does Not Specify
Location, 24 A.L.R. 4th 1053, 1064-1065.
4
McArthur v. East Tennessee Natural Gas Co., 813 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Tenn.
1991).
5
Arkansas Val. Elec. Co-op. Corp. v. Brinks, 240 Ark. 381, 383, 400 S.W.2d
278, 279 (1966); Howard v. Cramlet, 56 Ark. App. 171, 174-175, 939 S.W.2d
858, 859-860 (1997); Ballard v. Titus, 157 Cal. 673, 683, 110 P. 118, 122 (1910);
Daniel v. Clarkson, 338 S.W.2d 691, 692-693 (Ky. 1960); Bethel v. Van Stone,
120 Idaho 522, 5 2 7 - 5 2 8 , 817 P.2d 188, 193-194 (Ct. App. 1991); Larson v.
Amundson, 414 N.W.2d 413, 417 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Graves v. Gerber, 208
Neb. 209, 214, 302 N.W.2d 717, 720 (1981); Sussex Rural Elec. Co-op. v. Want7-6
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select a reasonable route. 6 If the parties are unable to reach an
agreement, a court may specify a location for the easement. 7
§ 7:6

D e s i g n a t i o n b y court

Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Easements <^46y 61
Parties frequently disagree over the location and dimensions of
an express easement. Consequently, the description issue is often
litigated. The initial point of inquiry is to determine whether the
instrument creating the easement adequately locates the easement and describes its dimensions. 1 When interpreting express
easements, courts usually s t a r t with the proposition t h a t the
age Tp., 217 N.J. Super. 481, 490, 526 A.2d 259, 263-264 (App. Div. 1987); Pomygalski v. Eagle Lake Farms, Inc., 192 A.D.2d 810, 811, 596 N.Y.S.2d 535, 537
(3d Dep't 1993); Abdalla v. State Highway Commission, 261 N.C. 114, 119, 134
S.E.2d 81, 85 (1964); McConnell v. Golden, 104 R.I. 657, 663, 247 A.2d 909, 912
(1968); Smith v. Commissioners of Public Works of City of Charleston, 312 S.C.
460, 469, 441 S.E.2d 331, 337 (Ct. App. 1994); Patch v. Baird, 140 Vt. 60, 66,
435 A.2d 690, 691-692 (1981); R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d
581, 588 (Wyo. 1999) (citing this treatise); Location of Easement of Way Created
by Grant Which Does Not Specify Location, 24 A.L.R. 4th 1053. See also Lawson v. Sipple, 319 Ark. 543, 553-554, 893 S.W.2d 757, 762 (1995) (location of
floating easement for mailbox must be reasonable and is subject to servient
estate owner's "right to delimit"). But see Colvin v. Southern Cal. Edison Co.,
194 Cal. App. 3d 1306, 1312, 240 Cal. Rptr. 142, 146 (2d Dist. 1987) (easement
holder has right to select reasonable location on servient estate for unlocated
easement) (abrogated on other grounds, by Ornelas v. Randolph, 4 Cal. 4th
1095, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 847 P.2d 560 (1993)).
6

See sources cited supra note 5.
Bethel v. Van Stone, 120 Idaho 522, 527-528, 817 R 2 d 188, 193-194 (Ct.
App. 1991); Maddox v. Katzman, 332 N.W.2d 347, 352 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982);
Daniel v. Clarkson, 338 S.W.2d 691, 693 (Ky. 1960); Graves v. Gerber, 208 Neb.
209, 214, 302 N.W.2d 717, 720 (1981).
7

[ S e c t i o n 7:6]
1
For cases in which the express easement description was found adequate,
see Consolidated Amusement Co., Ltd. v. Waikiki Business Plaza, Inc., 6 Haw.
App. 312, 317, 719 P.2d 1119, 1123 (1986); Lindhorst v. Wright, 1980 OK CIV
APP 42, 616 P.2d 450, 454 (Okla. Ct. App. Div. 1 1980) ("The language in the
deed is clear. It granted 'a perpetual right of ingress and egress on and across
the easterly 40 feet of the SW/4 of. . . Section 14/ . . . This description is definite and admits of no ambiguity." (emphasis in original)); Salmon v. Bradshaw,
84 S.D. 500, 505, 173 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1969); Semler v. Hartley, 184 W. Va. 24,
399 S.E.2d 54, 56-57 (1990) (finding no ambiguity in grant regarding width of
easement and reversing judgment based on extrinsic evidence). See generally
Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 854-855 (Wyo.
1996) (quoting extensively from this section of this treatise).
e
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terms of the written instrument control.2 If the terms of description are inadequate or nonexistent, then extrinsic evidence generally may be considered to ascertain the intent of the parties as
to the location and dimensions of the easement. 3 The parties are
presumed to have intended an easement that is reasonably convenient or necessary under the circumstances.4 As the Supreme
2
Andersen v. Edwards, 625 P.2d 282, 286 (Alaska 1981); Kotick v. Durrant,
143 Fla. 386, 392, 196 So. 802, 805 (1940); Consolidated Amusement Co., Ltd. v.
Waikiki Business Plaza, Inc., 6 Haw. App. 312, 317, 719 P.2d 1119, 1123 (1986);
Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. Gold Crown Properties, Inc., 221 Kan. 579, 584, 561
P.2d 818, 8 2 2 - 8 2 3 (1977); Munchmeyer v. Burfield, 1996 WL 142579, a t *3
(Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. Washington County 1996) (citing this treatise); Lindhorst v. Wright, 1980 OK CIV APP 42, 616 P.2d 450, 453 (Okla. Ct. App. Div. 1
1980); Salmon v. Bradshaw, 84 S.D. 500, 505-506, 173 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1969).
3
See Lazy Dog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp., 965 P.2d 1229, 1235-1237
(Colo. 1998); Wulf v. Tibaldo, 680 P.2d 1348, 1350 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Hynes
v. City of Lakeland, 451 So. 2d 505, 511 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1984); Vallas v. Johnson, 72 111. App. 3d 281, 284, 28 111. Dec. 580, 390 N.E.2d 939, 942 (3d
Dist. 1979); Anchors v. Manter, 1998 ME 152, 714 A.2d 134, 140 (Me. 1998);
Highway 7 E m b e r s , Inc. v. N o r t h w e s t e r n Nat. Bank, 256 N.W.2d 2 7 1 , 277
(Minn. 1977); Hoelscher v. Simmerock, 921 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D.
1996); T a n n e r v. Dream Island, Inc., 275 Mont. 414, 422, 913 P.2d 641, 646
(1996) (circumstantial evidence used to identify roads noted in 1932 deeds);
Barton's Motel, Inc. v. Saymore Trophy Co., Inc., 113 N.H. 333, 335, 306 A.2d
774, 775-776 (1973); Briggs v. Di Donna, 176 A.D.2d 1105, 1106-1107, 575 N.Y.
S.2d 407, 408-409 (3d Dep't 1991); Tipperman v. Tsiatsos, 140 Or. App. 282,
286, 915 P.2d 446, 449 (1996), review allowed, 324 Or. 176, 922 P.2d 669 (1996)
and decision affd in part and modified on other grounds, 327 Or. 539, 964 P.2d
1015 (1998); Sacco v. N a r r a g a n s e t t Elec. Co., 505 A.2d 1153, 1155-1156 (R.I.
1986) ("The easement created was described only as 'a certain way or drive
along the Easterly line of [the grantees'] t r a c t / Therefore, t h e court properly
considered extrinsic evidence in order to ascertain the p a r t i e s ' intention.");
Moore v. Reynolds, 285 S.C. 574, 578-579, 330 S.E.2d 542, 545 (Ct. App. 1985);
Morse v. Murphy, 157 Vt. 410, 4 1 1 - 4 1 2 , 599 A.2d 1367, 1367-1368 (1991)
(concluding a m b i g u i t y d e b a t a b l e a n d finding e x t r i n s i c evidence properly
considered); Waskey v. Lewis, 224 Va. 206, 211, 294 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1982);
R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 586 (Wyo. 1999) (citing this
treatise); Location of E a s e m e n t of Way Created by G r a n t Which Does Not
Specify Location, 24 A.L.R. 4th 1053. But see Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 R 2 d 500,
505, 62 A.L.R.5th 847 (Wyo. 1994) ("Presently, Wyoming law requires specific
descriptions for easements recorded after May 20, 1981."); Wyo. Stat. § 34-1-141
(easement created without specific location is void unless description of location
is recorded within one year of execution of easement).
4
Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Savage, 863 F. Supp. 198, 201-202,
131 O.G.R. 365 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (fifty-foot width found reasonable under circumstances); Barton's Motel, Inc. v. Saymore Trophy Co., Inc., 113 N.H. 333, 335,
306 A.2d 774, 776 (1973); Oliphant v. McCarthy, 208 A.D.2d 1079, 1080, 617
N.Y.S.2d 555, 557 (3d Dep't 1994) ("The express grant, however, does not specify
the width of the right-of-way and, in such case, its width is construed to be t h a t
which is necessary for the use for which the right-of-way was created. . . .");
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Court of Kansas stated in an oft-quoted opinion
The law appears to be settled that where the width, length and location of an easement for ingress and egress have been expressly
set forth in the instrument the easement is specific and definite
The expressed terms of the grant or reservation are controlling in
such case and considerations of what may be necessary or reasonable to a present use of the dominant estate are not controlling If,
however, the width, length and location of an easement for ingress
and egress are not fixed by the terms of the grant or reservation the
dominant estate is ordinarily entitled to a way of such width, length
and location as is sufficient to afford necessary or reasonable ingress
and egress 5
North Carolina courts, however, take a significantly
strictive approach to the description issue, holding that
ment grant or reservation is void for uncertainty if it
adequately describe the location of the easement 6 The
Court of Appeals of West Virginia also has adopted the

more rean easedoes not
Supreme
approach

Crane Hollow, Inc v Marathon Ashland Pipe Line, LLC, 138 Ohio App 3d 57,
66 71, 740 N E 2d 328, 334 338 (4th Dist Hocking County 2000), Munchmeyer
v Burfield, 1996 WL 142579, at 3 (Ohio Ct App 4th Dist Washington County
1996) (citing this treatise), Patterson v Duke Power Co , 256 S C 479, 486, 183
S E 2d 122, 125 (1971), Smith v Commissioners of Public Works of City of
Charleston, 312 S C 460, 467 468, 441 S E 2d 331, 336 (Ct App 1994), Atkin
son v Mentzel, 211 Wis 2d 628, 642, 566 N W 2d 158, 164 (Ct App 1997)
("
[T]he reasonable convenience of both parties is of prime importance "),
R C R , Inc v Rainbow Canyon, Inc , 978 P 2d 581, 587 (Wyo 1999) (quoting
this treatise), 3 Tiffany, Law of Real Property (3d ed ) § 804, Width of Way Cre
ated by Express G r a n t , Reservation, or Exception Not Specifying Width, 28
A L R 2d 253 See also Mugar v Massachusetts Bay T r a n s p Authority, 28
Mass App Ct 443, 445, 552 N E 2d 121, 123-124 (1990) (noting general rule,
but concluding t h a t it is "inapplicable to eminent domain proceedings"), Hall v
Allen, 771 S W 2d 50, 53 (Mo 1989) ("If the location is not precisely fixed when
the easement is first created, the grantee is entitled to a convenient, reasonable,
and accessible use "), Giles v Parker, 304 S C 69, 72-73, 403 S E 2d 130, 132
(Ct App 1991) (discussing width)
5
Aladdin Petroleum Corp v Gold Crown Properties, Inc , 221 Kan 579, 584,
561 P 2d 818, 822 (1977) The rule set forth in Aladdin has been quoted with
approval in several cases See Andersen v Edwards, 625 P 2d 282, 286 (Alaska
1981), Squaw P e a k Community Covenant Church of Phoenix v Anozira
Development, Inc , 149 Ariz 409, 412, 719 P 2d 295, 298 (Ct App Div 1 1986),
Consolidated Amusement Co , Ltd v Waikiki Business Plaza, Inc , 6 Haw App
312, 317, 719 P 2 d 1119, 1123 (1986), Lindhorst v Wright, 1980 OK CIV APP
42, 616 P 2d 450, 453 (Okla Ct App Div 1 1980)
In Aladdin, the "easement itself was limited to the specific area between
two rows of trees, which amounted to a practical location of the right-of way "
221 Kan 579, 585, 561 P 2d 818, 823 (1977)
6
See Allen v Duvall, 311 N C 245, 249, 316 S E 2d 267, 271 (1984)
(adhering to view t h a t vague and uncertain description renders easement void,
but concluding t h a t extrinsic evidence may be employed to cure latent ambiguc
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t h a t an easement is void if it is not adequately described in the
i n s t r u m e n t seeking to create it. 7 Moreover, a few other courts
have expressed a comparatively strict s t a n d a r d regarding the
designation of a n easement's location, requiring t h a t the easem e n t description m e e t t h e general conveyancing s t a n d a r d for
identifying a parcel of land. 8
Once a court concludes t h a t the location or the dimensions of
the easement are not adequately described in the instrument, it
generally examines the surrounding circumstances to determine
the intent of t h e parties in this regard. 9 The parties may have
fixed the location and dimensions of the easement by oral or collateral written agreement. 1 0 If not, the courts look to various facity in grant or reservation), amount of j u d g m e n t modified on reh'g, 311 N.C.
745, 321 S.E.2d 125 (1984); Thompson v. Umberger, 221 N.C. 178, 19 S.E.2d
484 (1942); Parrish v. Hayworth, 138 N.C. App. 637, 638-642, 532 S.E.2d 202,
204-206 (2000) (easement not adequately described on plat or by considering
extrinsic evidence, b u t subsequent use established location); Wiggins v. Short,
122 N.C. App. 322, 326-328, 469 S.E.2d 571, 575-576 (1996) (express easement
failed because its location could not be determined); Williams v. Skinner, 93
N.C. App. 665, 671-672, 379 S.E.2d 59, 63-64 (1989) (applying North Carolina
rule t h a t latent ambiguity in description of easement may be made certain by
use of parol evidence, w h e r e a s p a t e n t ambiguity r e n d e r s e a s e m e n t void for
uncertainty); Adams v. Severt, 40 N.C. App. 247, 249, 252 S.E.2d 276, 278
(1979) ("The deed gives no beginning point and furnishes no means by which
the location of the proposed way may be ascertained. The ambiguity is a patent
one. Hence the attempted conveyance or reservation is void for uncertainty.").
7
Highway Properties v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 189 W. Va. 301, 431 S.E.2d 95, 98100 (1993) (quoting Allen v. Duvall with approval).
8
See, e.g., G e r m a n y v. Murdock, 99 N.M. 679, 6 8 1 , 662 P.2d 1346, 1348
(1983) (requiring a description from which a surveyor can locate the easement
on the servient estate, but noting t h a t "the easement can be ascertained from
the recorded documents and in fact was located by two registered surveyors");
Vrabel v. Donahoe Creek Watershed Authority, 545 S.W.2d 53, 54 (Tex. Civ.
App. Austin 1976) ("The description requires a certainty such t h a t a surveyor
can go upon the land and locate the easement from such description."). See also
Mueller v. Hoblyn, 887 P.2d 500, 505, 62 A.L.R.5th 847 (Wyo. 1994) ("Presently,
Wyoming law requires specific descriptions for easements recorded after May
20, 1981."); Wyo. Stat. § 34-1-141 (easement created without specific location is
void unless description of location is recorded within one year of execution of
easement).
9

See cases cited s u p r a note 3. See generally Location of Easement of Way
Created by Grant Which Does Not Specify Location, 24 A.L.R. 4th 1053 (discussing v a r i o u s factors c o u r t s consider in a s c e r t a i n i n g location t h a t p a r t i e s
intended); Width of Way Created by Express Grant, Reservation, or Exception
Not Specifying Width, 28 A.L.R. 2d 253 (analyzing matters courts examine in
determining width parties intended).
10
See Tipperman v. Tsiatsos, 140 Or. App. 282, 286, 915 P.2d 446, 449 (1996)
("The location of t h e e a s e m e n t . . . m a y be d e t e r m i n e d . . . by subsequent
7-10
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tors to establish a reasonable description of the easement. 11 As
noted by the highest court of Kentucky, this process "taxes the
best resources of judicial ingenuity." 12 One factor is the purpose
of the easement, 13 which is particularly important with respect to
ascertaining the dimensions of an inadequately described
easement. 14 Other factors include the geographic relationship between the dominant and the servient estates, 15 the use of each of
agreement."), review allowed, 324 Or. 176, 922 P.2d 669 (1996) and decision
affd in part and modified on other grounds, 327 Or. 539, 964 P.2d 1015 (1998);
Smith v. King, 27 Wash. App. 869, 871, 620 P.2d 542, 543, 24 A.L.R.4th 1049
(Div. 1 1980) (location can be established by oral agreement); see also Barton v.
Gammell, 143 Ga. App. 291, 295-296, 238 S.E.2d 445, 448 (1977) (location of
unlocated easements for use of lake, garden, and pasture found "never . . . in
dispute" because "[tlhe lake has been constructed and is shown on a plat of the
property also showing the dominant and servient tenements, and . . . the
p a s t u r e and garden a r e a s have been set a p a r t and denned . . . and . . .
plaintiffs have been using those areas with defendants' active participation and
assistance"); Umberger v. S t a t e ex rel. Dept of Game, Fish and Parks, 248
N.W.2d 395, 397 (S.D. 1976) (easement i n s t r u m e n t specifically provided for
mutual agreement as to route).
11
See sources cited infra notes 13-18; R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc.,
978 P.2d 581, 587 (Wyo. 1999) (citing this treatise).
12
Daniel v. Clarkson, 338 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Ky. 1960).
13
Hynes v. City of Lakeland, 451 So. 2d 505, 511 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 2d D i s t
1984); State ex rel. Hillhouse v. Hunter Raffety Elevator, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 400,
402 (Mo. Ct. App. S.D. 1982).
14
See Carnemella v. Sadowy, 147 A.D.2d 874, 876, 538 N.Y.S.2d 96, 98 (3d
Dep't 1989) ("The width is not described but [the] Supreme Court has most appropriately stated t h a t the width should be t h a t ordinarily and reasonably
required for a utility line as contemplated herein."); Crane Hollow, Inc. v.
Marathon Ashland Pipe Line, LLC, 138 Ohio App. 3d 57, 66-71, 740 N.E.2d 328,
334-338 (4th Dist. Hocking County 2000) (ascertaining width of pipeline easement); Tipperman v. Tsiatsos, 140 Or. App. 282, 286-289, 915 P.2d 446, 4 4 9 451 (1996), review allowed, 324 Or. 176, 922 P.2d 669 (1996) and decision affd
in part and modified on other grounds, 327 Or. 539, 964 P.2d 1015 (1998); Florek v. Com., Dept. of T r a n s p . , 89 Pa. Commw. 483, 490, 493 A 2d 133, 137
(1985) ("[W]e cannot say t h a t placing this [drainage] pipe in the same location,
albeit a t different depth, was inconsistent with the original purpose of the
easement."); Patterson v. Duke Power Co., 256 S.C. 479, 486, 183 S.E.2d 122,
124 (1971) ("Where a deed or other instrument grants the right-of-way but does
not specify the width of such way, the determination of the width becomes basically a matter of the construction of the instrument with strong consideration
being given to what is reasonably convenient and necessary to accomplish the
purpose for which the way was created."); Moore v. Reynolds, 285 S.C. 574, 579,
330 S.E.2d 542, 545 (Ct. App. 1985); Clearwater Realty Co. v. Bouchard, 146 Vt.
359, 361-362, 505 A.2d 1189, 1190-1191 (1985).
15
Perkins v. Perkins, 158 Me. 345, 350, 184 A.2d 678, 681 (1962); Barton's
Motel, Inc. v. Saymore Trophy Co., Inc., 113 N.H. 333, 335, 306 A.2d 774, 776
(1973).
c
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the estates, 1 6 the benefit to the easement holder compared to the
b u r d e n on t h e servient e s t a t e owner, 17 a n d admissions of t h e
parties 18 But the factor t h a t the courts most frequently rely on is
use of the servient estate for the purpose for which the easement
was created 19
Use existing at the time of the easement's creation is considered
strong evidence of the intended location and dimensions of the
e a s e m e n t 2 0 This is particularly true if the i n s t r u m e n t creating
the e a s e m e n t m a k e s some reference to an existing way 21 Use
16

Barton's Motel, Inc v Saymore Trophy Co , Inc , 113 N H 333, 335, 306
A 2d 774, 776 (1973)
17
Perkins v Perkins, 158 Me 345, 350, 184 A 2d 678, 681 (1962), State ex
rel Hillhouse v H u n t e r Raffety Elevator, Inc , 636 S W 2d 400, 402 (Mo Ct
App S D 1982), Barton's Motel, Inc v Saymore Trophy Co , Inc , 113 N H 333,
335, 306 A 2d 774, 776 (1973), see also Tipperman v Tsiatsos, 140 Or App 282,
289, 915 P 2d 446, 451 (1996), review allowed, 324 Or 176, 922 P 2d 669 (1996)
and decision affd in part and modified on other grounds, 327 Or 539, 964 P 2d
1015 (1998), Clearwater Realty Co v Bouchard, 146 Vt 359, 361-362, 505 A 2d
1189, 1191 (1985) (approving trial court's balancing "reasonable, convenient,
and accessible right-of way" for owner of dominant estate against potential inconvenience or interference with servient estate owner's use of servient land)
18
Kotick v Durrant, 143 Fia 386, 392, 196 So 802, 805 (1940), Hynes v City
of Lakeland, 451 So 2d 505, 511 (Fla Dist Ct App 2d Dist 1984)
19
See Location of Easement of Way Created by Grant Which Does Not Specify
Location, 24 A L R 4th 1053, 1058, 1065 1084, and cases cited therein
20
See Wilson v DeGenaro, 36 Conn Supp 200, 201-209, 415 A 2d 1334,
1335-1339 (Super Ct 1979), adopted, 181 Conn 480, 435 A 2d 1021 (1980) (lo
cation and width of right of way), Conley v Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265, 2 6 9 270, 985 P 2d 1127, 1131-1132 (1999) (width of road), Vallas v Johnson, 72 111
App 3d 281, 282-284, 28 111 Dec 580, 390 N E 2d 939, 941-942 (3d Dist 1979)
(width of e a s e m e n t of ingress and egress) Larson v Amundson, 414 N W 2d
413, 417-418 (Minn Ct App 1987) (recognizing principle, but finding t h a t original road did not become location of unlocated roadway easement because servi
ent owner had reserved right to fix location of new road), Mosher v Hart, 157
A D 2d 931, 931-932, 550 N Y S 2d 187, 188 (3d Dep't 1990) (location of right
of way), Sacco v Narragansett Elec Co , 505 A 2d 1153, 1155-1156 (R I 1986)
(location of right of way), Moore v Reynolds, 285 S C 574, 578 579, 330 S E 2d
542, 545 (Ct App 1985) (width of road), Cleveland v Tinagha, 1998 SD 9 1 , 582
N W 2d 720, 723 725 (S D 1998) (width of access easements), Jones v Fuller,
856 S W 2d 597, 602 (Tex App Waco 1993) (existing roadway established location), R C R , Inc v Rainbow Canyon, Inc , 978 P 2d 581, 587-588 (Wyo 1999)
(quoting this treatise and concluding t h a t "the intent of the parties in this case
is t h a t the easement was defined by the access road in existence at the time the
easement was created")
21
See Wilson v DeGenaro, 36 Conn Supp 200, 200-204, 415 A 2d 1334,
1335-1338 (Super Ct 1979) (instrument referred to "the driftway as now laid
out" (emphasis in original)), adopted, 181 Conn 480, 435 A 2d 1021 (1980),
Cleveland v Tmagha, 1998 SD 9 1 , 582 N W 2d 720, 723-725 (S D 1998) (deeds
referred to "existing trails and roadways"), Travis v Madden, 493 N W 2d 717,
7-12
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commenced after the execution of the easement and to which the
servient estate owner acquiesces is also persuasive. 2 2 However,
the courts must be careful to determine the location and dimensions of the easement on the basis of the circumstances at the
time the easement was created. 23 Once an inadequately described
easement is fixed by use and acquiescence, the holder cannot successfully claim that a different width or route is reasonably convenient or necessary. 24
719-720 (S.D. 1992) (grant referred to "roadway presently existing"); Was key v.
Lewis, 224 Va. 206, 211, 294 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1982) ("When an i n s t r u m e n t
refers to and grants a right of way over an already existing road, the right of
way is limited to the width of the road as it existed at the time of the grant.");
Width of Way Created by Express Grant, Reservation, or Exception Not Specifying Width, 28 A.L.R. 2d 253.
22
See Isenberg v. Woitchek, 144 Colo 394, 399-400, 356 P.2d 904, 907 (1960)
(location and width of right-of-way); Gjovig v. Spino, 701 P.2d 1267, 1268 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1985) (location and dimensions of easement of ingress and egress);
Peters v. Milks Grove Special Drainage Dist. No. 1 of Iroquois County, 243 111.
App. 3d 14, 18-19, 183 111. Dec. 141, 610 N.E.2d 1385, 1389 (3d Dist 1993) (location and width of drainage easement); Hall v. Allen, 771 S W.2d 50, 53 (Mo.
1989) (location of access easement); Area Real Estate Associates, Inc. v. City of
Raymore, 699 S.W.2d 461, 463-464 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1985) (location of sewer
line); Green v. Mann, 237 A.D.2d 566, 567, 655 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (2d Dep't
1997) (holding t h a t "longtime use, without objection by the servient tenement,
establishes the location of the easement"); Parrish v. Hayworth, 138 N.C App.
637, 642, 532 S.E.2d 202, 204, 206 (2000) (easement not adequately described
on plat or by considering extrinsic evidence, but subsequent use established location); Crane Hollow, Inc. v. Marathon Ashland Pipe Line, LLC, 138 Ohio App.
3d 57, 67-69, 740 N.E 2d 328, 335-336 (4th Dist. Hocking County 2000) (citing
this treatise); Flaherty v. DeHaven, 302 Pa. Super. 412, 416-417, 448 A.2d
1108, 1111 (1982) (location of right-of-way); R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon,
Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 587 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting this treatise); Edgcomb v. Lower
Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 854-855 (Wyo. 1996) (holding that
"current location of the transmission line is the one the parties intended" and
quoting this treatise).
23
See Wilson v. DeGenaro, 36 Conn. Supp. 200, 209, 415 A.2d 1334, 1339
(Super. Ct. 1979), adopted, 181 Conn 480, 435 A.2d 1021 (1980); Vailas v.
Johnson, 72 111. App. 3d 281, 282, 28 111. Dec. 580, 390 N.E.2d 939, 941 (3d D i s t
1979); R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 587 (Wyo. 1999) (citing this treatise).
24
City of Los Angeles v. Howard, 244 Cal. App. 2d 538, 541 n. 1, 53 Cal. Rptr.
274, 276 n.l (2d Dist. 1966) ("A 'floating easement' [power line in this case] . . .
becomes 'fixed' by the first usage thereof and, unless the right to change or
expand the usage is expressly granted or reserved, the usage may not thereaft e r be modified, e i t h e r in location or in d e g r e e beyond t h a t originally
established."); Wilson v. DeGenaro, 36 Conn. Supp. 200, 209, 415 A.2d 1334,
1338-1339 (Super. Ct. 1979), adopted, 181 Conn. 480, 435 A.2d 1021 (1980)
(right-of-way); Peters v. Milks Grove Special Drainage Dist. No. 1 of Iroquois
County, 243 111. App. 3d 14, 18-19, 183 111. Dec. 141, 610 N.E.2d 1385, 1389 (3d
e
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—Practical i m p a c t of floating e a s e m e n t s

Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Easements <S=>46
Floating e a s e m e n t s , as unlocated e a s e m e n t s a r e commonly
called, 1 h a v e a significant practical i m p a c t on t h e s e r v i e n t
tenement. These easements burden the entire servient estate and
therefore tend to hamper development, limit financing possibilities, and impede alienation of t h e property. 2 Hence, w h e n a n
e a s e m e n t is intentionally drafted as a floating servitude, t h e
owner of the servient tenement should seek to include provisions
t h a t limit the easement to a certain portion of the servient estate
and t h a t r e q u i r e t h e holder to designate its precise location
within a set period. In addition, the servient owner should seek
to include a provision in the easement requiring the easement
holder to execute a recordable instrument describing the selected
location. In a t least one jurisdiction, the easement holder m a y
Dist. 1993) (drainage ditch); Crane Hollow, Inc. v. Marathon Ashland Pipe Line,
LLC, 138 Ohio App. 3d 57, 67-68, 740 N.E.2d 328, 335 (4th Dist. Hocking
County 2000) (citing this treatise); Munchmeyer v. Burfield, 1996 WL 142579,
at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 4th Dist. Washington County 1996) (citing this treatise);
Houston Pipe Line Co. v. Dwyer, 374 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. 1964) (gas pipeline);
Mielke v. Yellowstone Pipeline Co., 73 Wash. App. 621, 624, 870 P.2d 1005,
1006 (Div. 3 1994) ("Where the grant of an easement does not specify its location, Washington courts have long held the initial selection of a location fixes
the location of the easement."); Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc.,
922 P.2d 850, 854-855 (Wyo. 1996) (quoting this treatise). See generally §§ 7:13
to 7:16 (discussing relocation), § 7:17 (analyzing change in dimensions). But see
Zettlemoyer v. Transcontinental Gas Pipeline Corp., 540 Pa. 337, 657 A.2d 920,
926 (1995) (finding t h a t "clearing of 30 additional feet beyond the 100 foot wide
right of way established in 1958 was 'reasonable and necessary* to effectuate
t h e purposes of t h e g r a n t " and stating: "We do not agree t h a t ' s u b s e q u e n t
agreement, use, and acquiescence* of a n easement establishes its width as a
matter of law when the written agreement is ambiguous."); see generally Recent
Decision, Eminent Domain—De Facto Taking—Easements, 34 Duq. L. Rev. 739
(1996) (discussing Zettlemoyer).
[ S e c t i o n 7:7]
1
See § 7:4, note 1 and accompanying text (defining and giving illustrations of
floating easements).
2
Missouri Public Service Co. v. Argenbright, 457 S.W.2d 777, 780-783 (Mo.
1970); R.C.R, Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc., 978 P.2d 581, 587 (Wyo. 1999) (citing this treatise); Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850,
8 5 4 - 8 5 5 (Wyo. L996) (citing t h i s t r e a t i s e ) ; H a z e n , E a s e m e n t s F r o m t h e
Viewpoint of the Title Insurer, 15 CaL St. B J 28, 32 (1940); Note, Real Property:
The Effect of Floating Easements Held by Pipeline Companies on Marketability
of Title and Land Values, 37 Okla. L. Rev. 180, 181-186 (1984); see also
McArthur v. E a s t Tennessee N a t u r a l Gas Co., 813 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tenn.
1991).
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have certain duties in this regard even when the easement instrument is silent on the subject. Citing public policy considerations,
such as safety, the Supreme Court of Tennessee required the
holder of a floating natural gas pipeline easement to record notice
of the location it selected for the easement. 3 It is unclear, however,
whether this decision applies to natural gas pipeline easements
only, utility easements in general, or all floating easements.
One who holds title to land already burdened by a floating
easement may minimize the burden of the easement by entering
into a n a g r e e m e n t w i t h the e a s e m e n t holder regarding t h e
easement's location. 4 This agreement may take the form of the
holder's release of the easement from all but a specified portion of
the servient estate. 5 If the parties cannot reach an agreement on
the subject, the servient owner should consider seeking a court
decree fixing a reasonable location. 6
§ 7:8

—Grants of m u l t i p l e floating e a s e m e n t s

Research References
West's Key Number Digest, Easements @=>46
Some express g r a n t s , particularly those involving pipelines,
provide that the servient estate is burdened by any easement of a
3
McArthur v. East Tennessee Natural Gas Co., 813 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tenn.
1991); see also Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 575 N.W.2d 578, 581
(Minn. 1998) (discussing, but finding inapplicable, Minn. Stat. § 300.045 which
r e q u i r e s "public service corporations, including pipeline companies," to
"definitely and specifically describe" easements they obtain).
4
Kratovil and Werner, Real Estate Law § 4.06(a) (9th e d ) (discussing floating pipeline easements); Note, Real Property: The Effect of Floating Easements
Held by Pipeline Companies on Marketability of Title and Land Values, 37
Okla L. Rev. 180, 188-192 (1984). See also Scherger v. Northern Natural Gas
Co., 575 N.W.2d 578, 581 (Minn. 1998) (discussing, but finding inapplicable,
Minn. Stat. § 300.045 which requires "public service corporations, including
pipeline companies," holding recorded easements that do "not include a definite
and specific description," to, "upon written request by the specific property
owner, produce and record . . . a definite and specific description").
5
Kratovil and Werner, Real Estate Law § 4.06(a) (9th ed ); Note, Real Property: The Effect of Floating Easements Held by Pipeline Companies on Marketability of Title and Land Values, 37 Okla. L. Rev. 180, 188-189 (1984). For a
sample "Partial Release of Rights of Way Grants" used with floating pipeline
easements, see id. at 193-194.
6
Note, Real Property: The Effect of Floating Easements Held by Pipeline
Companies on Marketability of Title and Land Values, 37 Okla. L. Rev. 180,
188-192 (1984).
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Location a n d Dimensions of E a s e m e n t s
Table of New and Retitled Sections
§ 7:16.1

R e l o c a t i o n — R e s t a t e m e n t (Third) of P r o p e r t y ' s a p p r o a c h to
r e l o c a t i o n [New]

KeyCite®: Cases and other legal materials listed in KeyCite Scope can be
researched through the KeyCite service on Westlaw® Use KeyCite to check
citations for form, parallel references, prior and later history, and comprehensive citator information, including citations to other decisions and secondary
materials

§7:1 Introduction
n. 5.
Amend citation to Kratovil and Werner in second sentence of note 5 by deleting
"24-25 (9th ed.)" and substituting therefor "26-27 (10th ed.)."
Add to "see generally" material in note 5:
; Werner, Real E s t a t e Law 21-22 (11th ed.) (offering guidelines for drafting
easements)

§ 7:2 Location and dimensions of express easements
n. 1.
Add after Hazen, Easements From the Viewpoint of the Title Insurer citation
in note 1:
; Mitchell v. Chance, 2004 WL 792067, *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing this
treatise)
n. 2.
Stevens v. Mannix, 77 P.3d 931, 932-933 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003);
Village of Wagon Mound v. Mora Trust, 2003 -NMCA- 035, 133 N.M. 373, 3 8 3 384, 62 P.3d 1255, 1265-1266 (Ct. App. 2002), cert, denied, 133 N.M. 413, 63
P.3d 516 (2003);
Mitchell v. Chance, 2004 WL 792067, *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing this treatise);
Vinson v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 221, 227 (Tex. App. Austin 2002);

§ 7:4 Location and dimensions of express easements—
Location or dimensions omitted or inadequately
described
n. L
Add to "See also" material in first paragraph of note 1:
Coughlm v. Anderson, 270 Conn. 487, 494 n.7, 853 A.2d 460, 466 n.7 (2004) (citing this treatise);
Village of Wagon Mound v. Mora Trust, 2003 -NMCA- 035, 133 N.M. 373, 3 8 3 © 2005 Thomson/West, 02/2005
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384, 62 P.3d 1255, 1265-1266 (Ct. App. 2002), cert, denied, 133 N.M. 413, 63
P.3d 516 (2003);
Sunnyside Valley Irr. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wash. 2d 873, 880, 73 P.3d 369, 372
(2003) ("An easement denned in general terms, without a definite location or description is called a floating or roving easement . . . .");
Add to "See ' material in second paragraph of note 1:
Evans v. Board of County Com'rs of U t a h County, 2004 UT App 256, 97 P.3d
697, 700 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) ("roving easement");
Sunnyside Valley Irr. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wash. 2d 873, 880, 73 P.3d 369, 372
(2003) ("roving easement");

§ 7:5 Location and dimensions of express easements—
Location or dimensions omitted or inadequately
described—Designation by parties
n. 1.
Add to "E.g." cases in note 1: - '
Vinson v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 221, 228 (Tex. App. Austin 2002) (grantor did not
exercise "expressly reserved . . . right to m a r k and establish boundaries of the
park");
Add at end of note 1:
See also Village of Wagon Mound v. Mora Trust, 2003 -NMCA- 035, 133 N.M.
373, 384, 62 P.3d 1255, 1266 (Ct. App. 2002), cert, denied, 133 N.M. 413, 63
P.3d 516 (2003) ("[I]t is not unusual for a deed creating a floating easement to
give the easement holder the right to later locate and fix the easement upon the
ground.").
n. 5.
Add to "But See" case in note 5:
Vinson v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 221, 228 (Tex. App. Austin 2002);
; Sunnyside Valley Irr. Dist. v. Dickie, 111 Wash. App. 209, 215, 43 P.3d 1277,
1281 (Div. 3 2002), review granted, 147 Wash. 2d 1020, 60 P.3d 93 (2002), affd
on other grounds, 149 Wash. 2d 873, 73 P.3d 369 (2003) (lower court -noting:
"When the description of an easeinent is not specified with the grant, the location is established and fixed w h e n t h e g r a n t e e selects t h e location of t h e
easement.")

§ 7:6 Location a n d dimensions of express easements—
Location or dimensions omitted or inadequately
described—Designation by court
n. 3.
Add to "See" cases in note 3:
Illig v. U.S., 58 Fed. CI. 619, 626 (2003) (citing this treatise);
Mitchell v. Chance, 2004 WL 792067, *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing this treatise);
n. 4.
Add to "See also" cases in note 4:
Walker v. Boozer, 140 Idaho 451, 95 P.3d 69, 72-73 (2004) (establishing width);
Intermount Distribution, Inc. v. Public Service Co. of North Carolina, Inc., 150
N.C. App. 539, 542-544, 563 S.E.2d 626, 629-630 (2002) (considering width of
easement for n a t u r a l gas pipeline);
rc. 6.
Add to "See" cases in note 6:
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King v. King, 146 N.C. App. 442, 444-445, 552 S.E.2d 262, 264-265 (2001)
(distinguishing between patent ambiguity in description which is fatal to easement and latent ambiguity which may be made certain by reference to extrinsic
evidence, and determining t h a t ambiguity in consent judgement's description of
easement location was latent);
n. 11.
Add before R.C.R., Inc. v. Rainbow Canyon, Inc. citation in note 11:
Mitchell v. Chance, 2004 WL 792067, *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing this treatise);
n. 13.
Sunnyside Valley Irr. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wash. 2d 873, 878-887, 73 R 3 d 369,
372-375 (2003).
n. 14.
; Intermount Distribution, Inc. v. Public Service Co. of North Carolina, Inc., 150
N.C. App. 539, 542-544, 563 S.E.2d 626, 629-630 (2002) (considering width of
easement for natural gas pipeline)
Sunnyside Valley Irr. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wash. 2d 873, 880, 73 P.3d 369, 372
(2003)("Under the doctrine of reasonable enjoyment, the width is restricted to
t h a t which is reasonably necessary and convenient to effectuate the original
purpose for granting the easement.").
n.20.
Add to "See" cases in note 20:
Ponderosa Pines Ranch, Inc. v. Hevner, 2002 MT 184, 311 Mont. 82, 86-88, 53
P.3d 381, 384-386 (2002) (citing this treatise);
n.21.
Add ", 267-271" at end of 28 A.L.R. 2d 253 citation in note 21.
n. 22.
Add to "See" cases in note 22:
Village of Wagon Mound v. Mora Trust, 2003 -NMCA- 035, 133 N.M. 373, 384,
62 P.3d 1255, 1266 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002), cert, denied, 133 N.M. 413, 63 P.3d
516 (2003);
Vinson v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 221, 228 (Tex. App. Austin 2002);

§ 7:7 Location and dimensions of express easements—
Practical impact of floating easements
71. 2.

Add to "see also" case in note 2:
Coughlin v. Anderson, 270 Conn. 487, 494 n.7, 853 A.2d 460, 466 n.7 (2004) (citing this treatise);

§ 7:9 Location and dimensions of express easements—
Designation of a r e a for easement does not
necessarily represent easement boundaries
n. 1.
Add to "see" cases in note 1:
Sand Lake Shoppes Family Ltd. Partnership v. Sand Lake Courtyards, L.C.,
816 So. 2d 143, 145-146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2002);

Amend sentence accompanying note 9 by deleting "neither party
can" and substituting therefor "the easement holder cannot."
© 2005 Thomson/West, 02/2005
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UTAH REAL PROPERTY L A W

§12 02(b)(2)

other non-crop substances. Generally, profits a prendre are treated the same way
as easements.16
§ 12.02(b), Creation.
§ 12.02(b)(1). Express Easements.
An easement may be created by express words of either a formal grant or of a
reservation or exception in a conveyance of land. A grant creates an easement in
the grantee, while a reservation may result in creating an easement for the grantor
m the land being conveyed. Easements may also be created as a covenant or
hrough a conveyance referring either to a plat depicting easements or to a
-ecorded declaration of easements. The same formalities apply to creation of
casements as in any other conveyance. As an easement is a property interest, the
creating instrument must satisfy the statute of frauds.18 The document should also
?e recorded in order to provide constructive notice to any subsequent purchaser.
Otherwise someone might purchase the property free of the easement under the
loctrine protecting a subsequent bona fide purchaser without notice.19
Questions of interpretation often arise regarding: (1) the extent of the easement
md (2) whether it is appurtenant or m gross.20 To avoid future litigation the
Iraftsman must use great care to identify clearly and specifically: (1) the parties,
2) the properties involved, (3) the kind of easement created (appurtenant or in
pross), and (4) the limits, permitted uses and duration of the easement.21
A recital of consideration should be included if the grant of easement is not
ncorporated in the conveyance of the underlying fee.22
§ 12.02(b)(2). Implied Easements.
Implied easements are three specific types — implied easements based on a
rior use, easements by necessity and easements implied from a subdivision plat.
Vhile express easements are created by written expressions of intent, implied
asements arise from the circumstances of a transaction or the circumstances

16. See BACKMAN & THOMAS, supra note 5, at § 1 01[2][e], RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 399,

>mment b
17. Robert Kratovil, Easement Draftsmanship and Conveyancing, 38 CAL L REV. 426,437-38 (1950)
18. Warburton v Virginia Beach Federal Sav & Loan Ass'n, 899 P.2d 779,781-782 (Utah 1995)
19. See 4 R POWELL & P ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 34 21 (Matthew Bender

>98), BACKMAN & THOMAS, supra note 5, at § 1.02[1]
20. Weggleland v Ujifusa, 384 P 2d 590 (Utah 1963)
21. A model form for the creation of an easement is included m ROBERT KRATOVIL, REAL
,TATE LAW 32-33 (Prentice-Hall 8th ed 1979), See Warburton v Virginia Beach Fed Sav &
>an Assoc, 899 P 2d 779, 782 (Utah 1995) See also Potter v Chadaz, 977 P 2d 533 (Utah Ct
>p 1999) Cannot create an easement in favor of a third party who is a stranger to the transaction
22. See Green v Stansfield, 886 P 2d 117 (Utah Ct App 1994)
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interruptions will suffice to prevent the prescnptive period from accruing. The
claimant would then have to start over in counting the required prescriptive period.
The same rules apply to both prescriptive easements and adverse possession
with regard to disabilities and the concept of tacking.49 Thus, as with adverse
possession cases, any incompetence based on infancy or mental condition of the
landowner at the beginning of the prescriptive time prevents the running of the
statute of limitations. Only possessory ownership is subject to interests arising
through prescnptive easements. Thus, remaindermen or other non-possessory future
interests are not affected until those interests become possessory. If the claimant and
his predecessors in interest ha^„ all met the requirements of prescription, their
successive penods of adverfiyji^e may be joined to meet the twenty-year
requirement. The successive adverse users must be in privity with one another,
which is commonly established by the documents of sale of the dominant estate.
Conveyance of the servient estate during the prescriptive period does not
interrupt the running of the period, but it may become important in determining
whether the servient owners knew or should have known of the use during the
entire period.50
~
Finally, government entities are not subject to the doctrine of prescriptive
easements. As the sovereign, the statute of limitations underlying the concept of
adverse possession or prescriptive easements is not applicable.51
§ 12.02(c).

Rights and Duties of Parties.

Both the easement owner and the owner of the servient estate must exercise
their rights so as not to interfere unreasonably with each other. If based on an
explicit grant, the extent of an easement is determined by the grant.
Interpretation is often required to determine the extent or scope of the
easement. Disputes occur regarding the easement's precise location or its
boundaries, its duration and what kinds of uses are permitted. Factors to be
considered in determining the easement's extent include (1) the express language
of the creating instrument, (2) the behavior of the parties at the time of the
easement's creation and their actions in arriving at their own interpretation of the
easement, and (3) the foreseeability of any challenged changes.54 The most
crucial starting point is the language of the written instrument. The parties, for
instance, can alter the normally applicable doctnnes by their specific language.
48. Wasatch Irr Co v Fulton, 65 P 205 (Utah 1901)
49. See 4 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 19, at § 34 10.

50. Zollinger v Frank, 175 P.2d 714,718 (Utah 1946).
51. See BACKMAN & THOMAS, supra note 5, at § 2 02[4][c]
52. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co v Moyle, 174 P 2d 148 (Utah 1946).
53. Weggleland v Ujifusa, 384 P 2d 590 (Utah 1963)
54. See 4 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 19, at § 34 12[2]

55. Labium v Rickenbach, 711 P 2d 225, 226 (Utah 1985), Wykoff v. Barton, 646 P 2d 756,
758 (Utah 1982).
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Another scope issue is the extent of permissible change because of passage of
time and normal evolution of the affected properties.66 Usually, the language
creating the easement has not anticipated the kinds of alterations or modifications
sought by the easement holder. As a general rule, courts permit changes if they
are reasonably foreseeable.67 If the changes are caused by advances in technology,
the easement use is generally allowed to keep pace with normal developments. For
example, old easements permitting a right of way for horse drawn carts will
typically be able to become a paved road for any kind of motorized vehicles.
The most difficult questions have involved the subdivision of the dominant
property or the construction of a multi-family dwelling to replace the original
single-family residence.69 Usually these changes are permitted even though the
intensity of use is increased. The key is whether the new uses were reasonably
foreseeable so the court is justified in determining that the expansion is in harmony
with the original intent of the parties and the purposes they established for the
easement. The courts will limit the extent of the change, however, if the alterations
or expansions impose an unreasonable burden on the servient property owner.
Public policy and the needs of society favor changes and improvements in an
easement for the benefit of the dominant estate, as long as the manifest intent of
the original parties was not to disallow changes and the burden on the servient
estate is not unreasonably increased.70 When there are several owners of an
easement in common, no one of them may make alterations in the easement
71

which will render it less convenient and useful to any one of the others.
§ 12.02(d). Transfer of Easements.
Once an easement is created, it becomes part of the burdened property. The
obligation to recognize the easement holder's rights automatically passes to
successors unless they are freed from the burden of the easement as bona fide
purchasers without notice. In modern subdivisions, each property owner is on
constructive notice of all easements indicated on the original subdivision plat or
in a Declaration of Restrictions (including easements, real covenants and
servitudes) provided the plat or declaration are properly recorded in a
jurisdiction's land records.72
Even if an easement is not part of the public records, the transfer of the burden
applies to subsequent owners of the servient property who have notice of the

66. See 4 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 19, at § 34.12[2].
67. Id.
68. Id. at §34.15.
69. Id. at §34.21.
70. Huble v. Cache County Drainage Dist. No. 3, 259 P.2d 893 (Utah 1953).
71. Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148 (Utah 1946).
72. See BACKMAN & THOMAS, supra note 5, at § 1.04[1].
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